The Prudent Investment Fiduciary Rules

James W. Watkins, III, J.D., CFP Emeritus^TM, AWMA®
InvestSense, LLC

I. Introduction

Recent statements by the EBSA leadership and Assistant DOL Secretary, Daniel Aronowitz, frame ERISA litigation as abusive,” “frivolous,” and in need of increased structural restrictions. Aronowitz has called for a “PSLRA” for ERISA, similar to the SEC Act covering the general securities market. Aronowitz has advocated for heightened pleading standards, restricted standing requirements, and judicial doctrines designed to shield ERISA fiduciaries from litigation and liability.

This position, however, is inconsistent with ERISA’s statutory design, controlling Supreme court precedent, and the legislative history of ERISA itself. Properly understood, ERISA depends upon participant-driven litigation as a primary enforcement mechanism. Therefore, efforts to restrict access to the courts undermine -not further- ERISA’s core purposes.

II. THE EBSA’s PRETEXTUAL JUSTIFICATION CONTRADICTS ERISA’S TEXT, PURPOSE, AND LEGISLATIVE DESIGN

A. ERISA Was Deliberately Designed As a Participant-Enforced Statute Providing Broad Access to Federal Courts

Congress’ intent is explicit in both statutory text and legislative history: ERISA is a remedial, litigation-driven enforcement regime.

1.. Statutory Mandate: “Ready Access to the Federal Courts”

ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b), provides:

“to protect … participants and beneficiaries … by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.”

This is not aspirational language; it is a structural directive that civil litigation is the primary enforcement mechanism.

2.. Legislative History Confirms Congress Intended Expansive Participant Litigation

The Senate and House Reports—consistently relied upon by the Supreme Court—state:

• Senate Report No. 93-127: ERISA is “designed specifically to provide… participants and beneficiaries with broad remedies for redressing or preventing violations.”
• Further: to provide “the full range of legal and equitable remedies … and to remove jurisdictional and procedural obstacles … which hampered effective enforcement.”
• House Report No. 93-533: enforcement provisions are to be “liberally construed to provide … broad remedies.”

3. Doctrinal Implications

Congress made three deliberate choices:

1. Participants—not regulators—would enforce fiduciary obligations
2. Courts—not agencies—would police fiduciary conduct
3. Barriers to litigation were to be removed, not erected

IiI. Supreme Court Doctrine Reinforces That Courts Already Possess Adequate Tools to Address Abusive Litigation

Recent Supreme Court oral arguments directly undermine claims that ERISA litigation requires additional gatekeeping.

A. Justice Jackson: Courts Already Police Frivolous Litigation

During oral argument (e.g., fiduciary breach / pleading sufficiency context), Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson emphasized:

“Don’t we already have tools to deal with frivolous litigation?”

She specifically referenced:

• Motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)
• Rule 11 sanctions
• Judicial control over discovery

And further:

“Why isn’t that sufficient?”

3. Litigation Significance

This line of questioning reflects a critical doctrinal principle:

The federal judiciary—not administrative agencies—controls the calibration of litigation burdens and abuse prevention.

4. Structural Separation: Judicial Case Management vs. Substantive Barriers

The Court’s discussion highlights a distinction:

ERISA’s design aligns exclusively with the left column.

IV. EBSA’s Amicus Positions Advocating Restrictions on ERISA Litigation Are Doctrinally Inconsistent with Congressional Design

The litigation positions advanced by the Employee Benefits Security Administration—particularly under leadership such as Daniel Aronowitz—frequently assert that ERISA litigation is plagued by “frivolous” claims requiring judicial constraint.

A. EBSA’s “Frivolous Litigation” Thesis

EBSA has argued in multiple amicus contexts that:

• ERISA litigation imposes undue burdens on plan sponsors
• Courts should impose stricter pleading or evidentiary thresholds
• Discovery should be curtailed to prevent abuse

B. Direct Conflict with Congressional Intent

These positions are irreconcilable with ERISA’s legislative design:

C. Conflict with Supreme Court Reasoning

EBSA’s approach is also inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s expressed view—articulated in questioning by Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson—that:

Existing procedural tools are sufficient to address abusive litigation.

D. Doctrinal Tension

EBSA’s position implicitly asserts:

Courts are incapable of managing ERISA litigation without additional constraints.

The Supreme Court’s response:

Courts already possess—and routinely employ—adequate mechanisms.

V. ERISA’s Trust-Law Foundations Further Undermine EBSA’s Restrictive Approach

ERISA is grounded in the common law of trusts. Under trust law:

• Beneficiaries have broad rights to sue fiduciaries
• Courts serve as the primary forum for enforcement
• Remedies are expansive and equitable in nature

Key Principle

Limiting access to courts is antithetical to fiduciary accountability.

EBSA’s litigation stance effectively inverts this structure by:

• Shielding fiduciaries from scrutiny
• Elevating sponsor interests over beneficiary rights
• Reintroducing the very enforcement barriers ERISA was enacted to eliminate

VI. Conclusion: EBSA’s Litigation Positions Represent a Structural Departure from ERISA’s Core Enforcement Model

The combined weight of:

• Statutory text (“ready access to the Federal courts”)
• Legislative history (“broad remedies,” “remove obstacles”)
• Supreme Court reasoning (courts already control frivolous litigation)

establishes a clear rule:

ERISA enforcement depends on robust participant access to judicial remedies, not administrative or judicial contraction of claims at the threshold.

Accordingly, any argument—whether advanced by EBSA or otherwise—that seeks to curtail participant litigation based on generalized concerns about “frivolous” suits is:

1. Contrary to congressional intent
2. In tension with Supreme Court doctrine
3. Inconsistent with ERISA’s trust-law foundations

VII. ERISA’s Text and Legislative Purpose Affirmatively Enshrine Civil Litigation as a Core Enforcement Mechanism

EBSA’s attempt to characterize participant litigation as “frivolous” or excessive is irreconcilable with the statute Congress enacted.

Congress expressly designed ERISA to expand—not restrict—access to federal courts as a primary enforcement tool. The statute itself provides for “appropriate remedies and access to the federal courts” as a central means of protecting participants. 

This was not incidental. It reflects Congress’s deliberate rejection of an exclusively administrative enforcement regime in favor of participant-driven litigation as a necessary enforcement backstop.

A. Legislative Design: Private Enforcement Was Intended to Supplement Limited Government Oversight

ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme (§ 502(a)) was modeled to ensure that plan participants act as “private attorneys general”, filling enforcement gaps left by limited agency resources. Courts have repeatedly recognized that ERISA’s structure depends on private suits to ensure fiduciary accountability.

This design mirrors other federal statutes—such as the False Claims Act—where Congress explicitly empowered private litigants to vindicate statutory violations when government enforcement is insufficient. See, e.g., the qui tam mechanism allowing citizens to sue “on behalf of the government” to enforce statutory compliance. 

The analogy is instructive: Congress uses private litigation precisely where violations are difficult to detect and regulators face structural limits—conditions that are equally present in ERISA fiduciary misconduct.

B. Legislative History Confirms Congress Intended Broad, Participant-Friendly Court Access

The legislative history of ERISA repeatedly emphasizes that effective enforcement required ready access to federal courts:

• Congress intended “full and fair access to the courts” for participants and beneficiaries (Conference Report).
• Civil actions were designed as the “primary enforcement mechanism” to ensure fiduciary compliance.
• The statutory scheme reflects concern that without robust litigation rights, fiduciary standards would be “illusory.”

Thus, EBSA’s position willfully ignores congressional intent: what the agency labels “frivolous litigation” is, in fact, the mechanism Congress deliberately empowered to police fiduciary abuse.

VIII. EBSA’s Position Impermissibly Rewrites ERISA by Imposing Extra-Statutory Barriers to Suit

Recent policy arguments—such as heightened pleading standards, discovery stays, or procedural barriers justified by “meritless litigation”—are not neutral refinements. They are substantive restrictions on statutory rights.

As reflected in ongoing legislative proposals aimed at “curb[ing] meritless class actions” by raising pleading burdens and staying discovery, such efforts would materially limit participants’ ability to enforce ERISA rights. 

But those restrictions are for Congress—not EBSA—to enact. Agencies cannot:

• Rewrite § 502(a)’s broad grant of standing;
• Narrow judicial remedies Congress deliberately made expansive; or
• Rebalance enforcement away from participants toward regulated entities.

To do so violates basic separation-of-powers principles and the settled rule that agencies may not override statutory enforcement schemes through policy preferences.

IX. The “Frivolous Litigation” Narrative Is Factually and Structurally Misleading

A. ERISA Litigation Is Already Heavily Filtered by Courts

Federal courts already apply:

• Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal standards
• Heightened pleading requirements under modern jurisprudence
• Summary judgment standards
• Sanctions for frivolous claims

Thus, the premise that ERISA litigation proceeds unchecked is demonstrabl false and knowingly disingenous. The judiciary—not EBSA—is the constitutionally designated gatekeeper for merit.

B. Enforcement Data Shows Violations Are Widespread, Not Rare

Even EBSA’s own enforcement reporting demonstrates systemic noncompliance, with investigations resulting in widespread corrective actions affecting millions of participants. 

This undercuts any claim that litigation is predominantly frivolous; rather, it reflects pervasive fiduciary violations requiring enforcement.

X. EBSA’s Position Reflects Institutional Bias Favoring Plan Sponsors and Insurers

EBSA’s litigation-restrictive stance is not neutral. It aligns consistently with plan sponsor and insurance industry interests:

• Limiting discovery reduces exposure of fiduciary misconduct
• Raising pleading burdens shields conflicted transactions
• Curtailing class actions reduces aggregate liability

These positions functionally insulate fiduciaries and insurers from accountability, contrary to ERISA’s protective purpose.

XI. Daniel Aronowitz’s Advocacy Further Demonstrates Conflict of Interest

The credibility of the “frivolous litigation” narrative is further undermined by the role of Daniel Aronowitz.

A. Prior Industry Role Creates Structural Conflict

Before his governmental role, Aronowitz was a leading figure in the fiduciary liability insurance industry—a sector that:

• Directly profits from limiting litigation exposure
• Prices risk based on expected claims frequency and severity
• Benefits from procedural barriers that reduce claim viability

Policies restricting ERISA litigation therefore directly align with his prior industry interests.

B. Policy Positions Mirror Insurance Industry Objectives

Aronowitz has publicly advocated for:

• Reducing “excessive” ERISA litigation
• Increasing procedural barriers to participant claims
• Rebalancing enforcement away from private suits

These positions track precisely with insurance industry priorities to reduce claim payouts and litigation risk, reinforcing the appearance—and reality—of a conflict of interest.

XII. Curtailing Participant Litigation Undermines ERISA’s Core Protective Function

ERISA was enacted in response to widespread pension abuses, with Congress concluding that:

• Disclosure alone was insufficient
• Administrative oversight was limited
• Judicial enforcement was essential

Restricting participant access to courts would:

• Weaken fiduciary accountability
• Reduce deterrence of misconduct
• Shift enforcement toward an already resource-constrained agency

In short, it would recreate the very conditions ERISA was designed to eliminate.

XIII. Conclusion

“A tyrant always has a pretext for his tyranny.” – Aesop

Aronowitz and the current EBSA certainly have no shortage of pretextual claims for their biased policies. EBSA’s attempt to justify restricting ERISA litigation as a response to “frivolous claims” is:

1. Contrary to statutory text, which guarantees access to federal courts;
2. Inconsistent with legislative history, which designates civil litigation as a primary enforcement mechanism;
3. Unsupported by empirical reality, given documented widespread violations; and
4. Tainted by conflict of interest, particularly in light of Aronowitz’s prior role in the fiduciary insurance industry.

The questionable trends in the EBSA’s recent policies, as well as the willful blindness involved, and the easily foreseeable harm that could result, justifies an urgent call for Congress to immediately exercise Congressional oversight over the DOL, the EBSA, and Aronowitz to ensure compliance with the agency’s stated purposes, acting in the best interests of plan participants and their beneficiaries by ensuring the rights and protections guaranteed under ERISA. The urgency is even greater given the fact that The DOL has apparently suspended the ERISA Advisory Council, an oversight which portentially could have addressed the very issues issues addressed herein and prevented the types of pretexts and betrayal cueently being seen at the DOL and EBSA/

© Copyright 2026 InvestSense, LLC. All rights reserved

This article is for informational purposes only and is neither designed nor intended to provide legal, investment, or other professional advice since such advice always requires consideration of individual circumstances. If legal, investment, or other professional assistance is needed, the services of an attorney or other professional advisor should be sought.

James W. Watkins, III, J.D., CFP Emeritus^TM, AWMA®

As I learn more about AI, I m amazed how useful if can be in preparing forensic analyses and trial presentation material. As a fiduciary risk management consultant, I continue to be amazed at how little pension plans and investment foiduciaries actually know about fiduciary law, especially the three Primary doctrinal sources of fiduciary law and the three core principles represented by each of the doctrinal sources.

The three primary doctrinal sources of fiduciary duty—trust law, equity law, and agency law—are fully consistent with, and in fact require application of, the three economic principles of: (1) commensurate return, (2) breakeven analysis, and (3) breakeven en point relative to participant life expectancy, particularly in the 401(k) context.

With a few contributions of my own, the following post was created by an AI prompt for a professional presentation entitled “Six ‘Secrets’ About In-Plan Annuities, ‘Income Solutions’ and Fiduciary LiabilityThat Your Plan Advisers Probably ‘Forget’ to Explain to You …And You Probably Didn’t Know to AskAbout!”

Executive Thesis

Across trust law, equity, and agency, fiduciary obligation is not satisfied by nominal parity (e.g., “same stated rate” or “guaranteed income”), but by economic equivalence measured ex ante.
Accordingly:

• Commensurate return is the substantive expression of loyalty and prudence.
• Breakeven analysis is the analytical method by which commensurate return is tested.
• Breakeven en point relative to life expectancy is the temporal constraint imposed by fiduciary law when mortality risk and forfeiture are present.

A fiduciary who ignores these principles acts inconsistently with all three foundational bodies of fiduciary law, even if formal disclosures are made or statutory safe harbors are invoked.

I. Trust Law: Preservation of Corpus and Economically Equivalent Exchange

A. Core Trust-Law Duties

Trust law imposes duties of:

• Loyalty
• Prudence
• Impartiality
• Preservation of trust corpus

These duties require the trustee to ensure that any exchange of trust property is economically equivalent or superior, evaluated at the time of decision.

B. Commensurate Return as Trust-Law Requirement

Under trust doctrine:

• A trustee may not trade liquidity, optionality, or principal protection for benefits that are not actuarially or economically equivalent.
• Expected return must be commensurate with risks imposed, including:
  • Mortality risk
  • Irrevocability
  • Loss of control
  • Embedded fees

A fixed or in-plan annuity that offers the same stated rate as a CD or stable value fund but embeds forfeiture risk fails the commensurate return requirement unless higher expected value compensates for that risk.

C. Breakeven Analysis as Trust Accounting

Breakeven analysis operationalizes trust-law prudence by asking:

At what point does the beneficiary recover the value of the property transferred into trust?

If:

• Breakeven occurs after normal life expectancy, or
• Recovery is contingent on survival beyond actuarial norms,

then the trustee has impaired corpus on an expected-value basis, violating trust law even if nominal income is paid.

II. Equity Law: Substance Over Form and Prevention of Unjust Enrichment

A. Equity’s Governing Principle

Equity disregards labels and focuses on economic substance.
Courts of equity intervene where:

• One party is unjustly enriched, or
• A fiduciary extracts value through asymmetry of information or power.

B. Commensurate Return as Anti–Unjust Enrichment Doctrine

Equity requires that:

• A fiduciary not profit at the beneficiary’s expense, directly or indirectly.
• Embedded margins, mortality credits retained by insurers, or forfeited principal constitute equitable enrichment unless offset by higher expected benefit.

Thus, equity aligns directly with commensurate return:
If the participant bears mortality risk without actuarial compensation, the fiduciary arrangement is inequitable.

C. Breakeven En Point as Equitable Boundary

Equity is especially sensitive to timing asymmetry:

• If the fiduciary or third party benefits immediately, while
• The beneficiary only benefits after surviving to an advanced age,

equity recognizes this as structural unfairness, even absent fraud.

A breakeven point beyond life expectancy:

• Converts retirement income into a speculative wager, and
• Violates equity’s prohibition against fiduciary-induced forfeiture.

III. Agency Law: Reasoned Decision-Making and Principal-Centered Outcomes

A. Agency Law Duties

As agents, fiduciaries must:

• Act solely in the principal’s interest
• Use reasonable care and competence
• Avoid conflicted recommendations
• Make decisions a reasonable fiduciary would make under similar circumstances

B. Commensurate Return as Rational Agency Standard

A reasonable agent:

• Does not recommend a product with inferior expected value when a functionally equivalent, lower-cost alternative exists.
• Must justify any trade-off with measurable compensating benefit.

Agency law therefore demands commensurate return as a condition of rational action.

C. Breakeven Analysis as Minimum Competence

Failure to perform breakeven analysis:

• Ignores foreseeable outcomes
• Constitutes decision-making without economic foundation
• Violates the agent’s duty of care

When mortality risk is present, a reasonable agent must ask:

• Will most principals live long enough to recover their capital?

If the answer is no, recommending the product is per se imprudent.

IV. Integration: Life Expectancy as the Fiduciary Time Horizon

A. Why Life Expectancy Is the Correct Benchmark

Across all three doctrines:

• Fiduciary obligations are evaluated ex ante, using known probabilities and the “knew or should have known standard un ERISA 404(a)/
• Normal life expectancy represents the median outcome for similarly situated participants.

Thus, fiduciary prudence requires that:

• Breakeven occur at or before life expectancy, not beyond it.

B. Rejection of “Long-Tail” Justifications

Arguments that:

• “Some participants live longer,” or
• “Income is guaranteed for life”

fail fiduciary scrutiny because:

• Fiduciary law protects the typical participant, not actuarial outliers.
• Guarantees do not cure expected-value loss.

V. Synthesis Table: Doctrinal Alignment

VI. Going Forward

The principles of commensurate return, breakeven analysis, and breakeven en point relative to life expectancy are not novel economic constructs. They are the analytical expressions of long-standing fiduciary doctrines rooted in trust law, equity, and agency.

A 401(k) fiduciary who:

• Transfers participant capital into a product with embedded forfeiture risk,
• Fails to demonstrate actuarial equivalence,
• And permits breakeven to occur beyond normal life expectancy,

violates fiduciary law in substance, regardless of disclosures, guarantees, or formal compliance.

This post also shows why the financial services and annuity industries have, and will continue to vehemently oppose any attempt to hold annuities to a true fiduciary standard- they knonw that annuities, as presently structured, can never meet a true fiduciary standard that complies with all of the issues addressed herein. My assertion can be easily proven with a properly constructed breakeven analyis, one that factors in both present value and mortality risk. We’ll save that for my next post!

© Copyright 2026 InvestSense, LLC. All rights reserved

This article is for informational purposes only and is neither designed nor intended to provide legal, investment, or other professional advice since such advice always requires consideration of individual circumstances. If legal, investment, or other professional assistance is needed, the services of an attorney or other professional advisor should be sought.

James W. Watkins, III, J.D., CFP Emeritus^TM, AWMA®

This past week has been a pivotal week in terms of American workers and their Rights and Protections under ERISA. The DOL finally announced what many had suspected – they would not pursue their defense of their Retirement Security Rule (Rule}. When one considers the strong litigation advantage the DOL seemingly  held as a result of two prominent federal judges having issued two strong opinions supporting both the Rule itself and, more importantly, the process the DOL used in drafting the Rule, I have stated my belief that the DOL’s actions constitute a betrayal of American workers.

Admittedly a very strong strong opinion, but consider the following facts:
(1) Judge Barbara Lynn, Head Judge of the Northern District of Texas, wrote an excellent and detailed legal analysis of both the need for the Rule, especially the need to prevent the ongoing manipulative  and misleading marketing of fixed indexed annuities (FIAs) to retirees.

Anyone ever considering an annuity should always insist on receiving a properly prepared breakeven analysis, one that factors in both present value and mortality risk.Annuity agents typically refuse to provide such analyses. Fortunately, AI now provides a free means of investors gathering such information through a properly prepared AI prompt.

Don’t believe me. Try the following prompt:

“Prepare a breakeven analysis, factoring in both present value and mortality risk, on a $50,000 immediate annuity for a 65 year old (need to specify male/female), paying $1500 a year (or based on whatever interest rate you want), based upon a normal life expectancy.”

What a properly prepared breakeven analysis typically exposes is that the odds are heavily against the annuity owner breaking even, i.e., receiving a commensurate return, a return of their original investment. Put another way, a breakeven analysis typically shows that an annuity is a bet, a bad bet, one which results in the annuity issuer typically receiving a significant windfall at the annuity owner’s expense. Equity law is a cornerstone of fiduciary law, requiring full disclosure and fair treatment of an investor. Annuities typically do neither.

Equally troublesome was the DOL’s announcement that it intends to propose a new fiduciary Rule in early 2026. A basic rule of litigation is maximize the strength of your case whenever possible. The DOL had two exceptional opinions from well-respected federal judges supporting the DOL’s arguments and the DOL just wasted the opinions. I have argued that the two judges’ opinions were like holding five aces in a poker game, and the DOL just folded. In my mind, wasting the two strong opinions and the seeming advantage they could have provided going  forward constitutes a betrayal of American workers unless and until the DOL explains its action. At a minimum, the judges’ opinions would have put the annuity industry on the defensive.

(2) The annuity industry would probably argue that annuity investors can purchase a rider that does guarantee a return of their principal…for yet another fee, typically in the range of 1 percent. Keep in mind that both the DOL and GAO have published their findings on the cumulative impact of costs/fees on an investor. Their findings – over 20 years, each additional 1 percent in costs/fees reduces an invetror’s end-return by approximately 17 percent. With an annuity’s regular annual cost/fees typically in the 2 percent range, a rider fee of 1 percent would result in a projected loss in end-return of 51%, resulting in yet another advantage in favor of the annuity issuer at the annuity owner’s expense.

As if the DOL’s betrayal was not enough, Republican Congressman Randy Fine has introduced the “ERISA Litigation Reform Act,” calling for “strengthening” of pleading standards in ERISA actions. On first glance, my immediate reaction was that Congressman Fine must not be aware that Rule 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure clearly states that plaintiffs are not required to plead a defendant’s state of mind with specificity since no one can know someone’s thought processes. With regard to a defendant’s thought processes, general allegations are sufficient.

But Congressman Fine does not stop there. His bill also seeks to restrict the plan participants’ access to discovery, while at the same time requiring greater specificity on alleged fiduciary breaches.

I would argue that Congress Fine’s staff did not do their due diligence before arguing for greater specificity without allowing any discovery. I would suggest that Congressman Fine’s staff is guilty of the same frivolous activity that the Congressman falsely accuse plaintiffs of doing. Numerous courts have handed down decisions supporting the necessity of some discovery in connection with ERISA actions, as well as the availability of methods by which courts can prevent onerous and unnecessary costs. For example:

• (1) “Discovery holds the promise of sharpening this process-based inquiry – one that plaintiffs could not reasonably be expected to detail without access to the fiduciaries’ internal considerations.”
  Forman v. TriHealth, Inc., 40 F.4^th 443 (6th Cir. 2022)
  
• “It is implausible to expect that a plaintiff will have personal knowledge of the details regarding the internal processes by which fiduciaries make decisions…ERISA plaintiffs generally lack the inside information necessary to make out their claims.in detail, and thus cannot be held to a heightened standard of pleading.”
  Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585 (8th Cir. 2009)
  
• Plaintiffs cannot reasonably be expected to know the details of the fiduciaries’ internal investment
  deliberations before discovery, which “resides uniquely with defendants.”
  Leber v. Citigroup 401(k) Plan Inv. Comm., 2014 WL 4851816 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2014) (Judge Sidney H. Stein)
• “[i]nternal fiduciary process is normally in the sole possession of the defendant. ERISA plainfiffs face “inherent information asymmetry ”
  Sweda v. Univ. of Pennsylvania, 923 F.3d 320, 332-333 (3d Cir. 2019)
  
• “Plaintiffs” cannot plead “the inner workings of fiduciary decision-making “ without discovery.
  Hughes v. Northwesytern Univ., 83 F.4th 615, 629 (7th Cir. 2023).

Finally, to understand the strength of my arguments, one would need to read both Judge Lynn’s and Judge Stewart’s opinions. both of which are well reasoned and detailed. Judge Lynn’s opinion is Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d 152, 190 (N.D. Tex. 2017). Judge Stewarts dissenting opinion on the 5th Circuit’s decision to stay the Rule is American Council of Life Insurers et al v. Hugler, Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Case No. 17-10238 (3/15/2018).The decision can be downloaded at the Fifth Circuit’s web site.

And finally, before I posted this post, I started a poll on LinkedIn. The question was simple;
“Why do you think the DOL suddenly decided not to pursue an appeal in the Retirement Security Rule case? The options were A. They were afraid they would prevai or B. they were afraid they would lose. Thus far, 74 percent of the respondents have voted for option A. Interesting.

© Copyright 2025 InvestSense, LLC. All rights reserved

This article is for informational purposes only and is neither designed nor intended to provide legal, investment, or other professional advice since such advice always requires consideration of individual circumstances. If legal, investment, or other professional assistance is needed, the services of an attorney or other professional advisor should be sought.