May It Please the Court: Closing Argument On Fiduciary Duty of Disclosure Under ERISA Section 404(a) and Section 78(3) of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts

Posted on June 23, 2026 by jwatkins

James W. Watkins, III, J.D., CFP EmeritusTM, AWMA®
InvestSense, LLC

May it please the Court:

This case concerns a fundamental proposition that predates ERISA, predates modern securities law, and lies at the very heart of the law of trusts: a fiduciary cannot withhold material information from those to whom fiduciary duties are owed.

The issue before this Court is not whether a fiduciary acted with subjective good intentions, nor whether the fiduciary followed internal procedures, documented meetings, or retained consultants. The issue is whether fiduciaries discharged their affirmative duty of loyalty and disclosure by providing participants the information necessary to protect their own interests.

The answer is found in the law of trusts itself.

I. The Restatement Recognizes an Affirmative Duty to Disclose Material Information

Section 78(3) of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts1 provides that:

“Except in discrete circumstances, a trustee has a duty to the beneficiaries to deal fairly and to communicate to the beneficiary material facts affecting the beneficiary’s interest which the trustee knows or should know the beneficiary needs to know for the protection of the beneficiary’s interests.”

This rule is neither novel nor aspirational. It represents centuries of trust law recognizing that loyalty requires candor. A fiduciary who possesses material information affecting a beneficiary’s interests cannot remain silent merely because the beneficiary failed to ask the correct question.

ERISA expressly incorporates the common law of trusts as its interpretive foundation. The Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed that courts must look to trust law in defining the content of fiduciary duties. See, e.g., ERISA cases such as Varity Corp. v. Howe2 and Tibble v. Edison International.3

The Restatement’s duty to disclose therefore supplies an essential component of ERISA’s duties of loyalty and prudence.

II. “Material” Information Must Carry Its Established Legal Meaning

The Restatement does not define materiality in a vacuum. The concept has long possessed an established legal meaning.

The Supreme Court’s securities decisions provide the most developed and widely accepted articulation of materiality in TSC Industries. Inc. v. Northway, Inc.4 The Court held that information is material if there exists:

“a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider it important.”

The Court further explained that material information is that which would have significantly altered the “total mix” of information available.

That standard was reaffirmed in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson5, which rejected both excessively narrow and excessively expansive definitions of materiality.

Although these cases arose under the securities laws, the underlying principle is universal. Materiality concerns information sufficiently important that a reasonable person would regard it as significant in making decisions affecting his or her economic interests.

ERISA participants make decisions regarding contributions, investments, rollovers, distributions, retirement timing, and benefit elections. The same reasonable-investor framework therefore provides the most logical and legally coherent standard for determining what information fiduciaries must disclose.

III. The “Knew or Should Have Known” Standard Imposes an Objective Duty

Section 78(3) is equally important because it rejects a purely subjective standard.

A fiduciary’s duty extends to information the fiduciary “knew or should have known.” This language imposes an objective obligation.

ERISA fiduciaries cannot avoid liability by remaining deliberately uninformed, by failing to investigate, or by compartmentalizing information among committees, consultants, and service providers. A fiduciary charged with managing retirement assets must exercise the diligence necessary to discover material information affecting participants’ interests.

This principle parallels ERISA’s prudent-investigation requirement recognized in decisions such as:

  • Donovan v. Bierwirth6
  • Tibble v. Edison International7
  • Hughes v. Northwestern University8

A fiduciary cannot disclose information it never sought to obtain. Thus, the duties of prudence and disclosure operate together. The duty to investigate supplies the knowledge that the duty to disclose requires.

IV. Disclosure Is an Expression of Loyalty

The duty of loyalty demands more than the avoidance of self-dealing. A fiduciary acts loyally only when it places the beneficiary’s interests first. That obligation necessarily includes furnishing participants with information necessary to protect those interests.

Silence can itself constitute disloyal conduct. The Supreme Court recognized this principle in Varity Corp. v. Howe9, holding that fiduciaries may not materially mislead plan participants when communicating about plan benefits and participant interests.

A partial disclosure that omits material facts may be just as misleading as an outright falsehood. If fiduciaries know—or should know—that participants require certain information to protect their retirement interests, Section 78(3) requires disclosure.

V. Material Information in the ERISA Context

Material information may include:

  • Significant investment risks.
  • Conflicts of interest.
  • Revenue-sharing arrangements.
  • Material fees and expenses.
  • Limitations of investment products.
  • Information concerning fiduciary investigations.
  • Known risks affecting retirement outcomes.
  • Information bearing on the prudence of investment options.
  • Facts necessary to evaluate the security of promised benefits.

The relevant inquiry is straightforward:

Would a reasonable participant consider the information important in making decisions concerning retirement assets or benefits?

If the answer is yes, the information is material.

VI. Procedural Formalities Cannot Substitute for Disclosure

The EBSA’s current position notwithstanding, a fiduciary cannot satisfy its obligations merely by conducting meetings, retaining consultants, or creating documentation. A flawless process that withholds material information from participants remains inconsistent with fiduciary principles.

Section 78(3) recognizes that beneficiaries frequently suffer from informational asymmetry. Fiduciaries possess information, expertise, and access that participants lack. The law therefore places the burden upon the fiduciary—not the beneficiary—to communicate material facts.

This principle is particularly important in defined contribution plans, where participants increasingly bear investment risks and retirement outcomes depend heavily upon information known by fiduciaries and service providers.

Conclusion

Section 78(3) of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts establishes an affirmative fiduciary duty to disclose material information that fiduciaries knew or should have known beneficiaries needed to protect their interests.

Materiality should be evaluated using the objective standards articulated by the Supreme Court in TSC Industries and Basic: whether there exists a substantial likelihood that a reasonable participant would consider the information important, and whether disclosure would significantly alter the total mix of information available.

ERISA’s trust-law foundations compel this result.

The duty of loyalty requires candor.

The duty of prudence requires investigation.

The duty of disclosure requires communication.

Together, these principles ensure that retirement plan participants are not left to navigate critical financial decisions in informational darkness while fiduciaries possess material facts affecting their interests.

The law of trusts does not permit such silence. ERISA does not permit such silence. And this Court should not permit such silence.

The Fiduciary Duty of Disclosure Applied to In-Plan Annuities

The foregoing principles become particularly significant when applied to in-plan annuities because the fiduciary disclosure obligation extends not merely to the existence of a guaranteed lifetime income feature, but to all material facts that a fiduciary knew or should have known that participants would need to protect their retirement interests.

If a fiduciary offers an in-plan annuity while possessing—or while reasonably being expected to possess—information indicating that many participants are unlikely to achieve economic breakeven, such information may constitute material information under both Section 78(3) and ERISA’s fiduciary standards.

VII. In-Plan Annuities and the Duty to Disclose Material Information

In-plan annuities present a classic case of informational asymmetry.

The plan sponsor, fiduciary committee, consultants, insurers, and recordkeepers generally possess sophisticated actuarial, financial, and mortality information that the average participant neither possesses nor can independently obtain.

Participants frequently hear only the appealing phrase:

“Guaranteed income for life.”

However, Section 78(3) requires disclosure of material facts necessary for participants to protect their interests. That duty extends beyond marketing descriptions.

A fiduciary that knows, or should know, that certain economic characteristics materially affect the participant’s decision must disclose those characteristics. Such information may include:

  • Expected breakeven ages.
  • Present-value losses associated with annuitization.
  • Mortality probabilities.
  • The likelihood of recovering principal.
  • The cost of optional death-benefit riders.
  • Inflation effects.
  • Opportunity costs.
  • The economic consequences of irrevocable elections.

These are not peripheral considerations. They are material information that central to the participant’s decision. They are necessary to satisfy ERISA Section 404(a)’s requirement that a plan sponsor provide a plan particiapnt with “sufficient information to make an informaed decision.”

VIII. Materiality Under the Supreme Court Standard

Under the materiality standard established in TSC Industries and Basic, information is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable participant would consider it important in making a retirement decision.

Few facts could be more important to a reasonable participant than:

  • The probability of living long enough to break even.
  • The present-value reduction required to purchase lifetime guarantees.
  • The possibility that premature death results in forfeiture of principal.
  • The fact that principal protection often requires additional riders and additional costs.

If disclosure of these facts would significantly alter the “total mix” of information available to the participant, they are material as a matter of law.

A participant who hears only that an annuity provides “guaranteed income for life” receives an incomplete picture if the participant is not informed that actuarial probabilities may indicate a substantial likelihood that the participant will never recover the value of the premium transferred to the insurer.

IX. Breakeven Analysis as Material Information

A properly prepared breakeven analysis generally incorporates:

  1. Present value of future payments.
  2. Mortality probabilities.
  3. Time value of money.
  4. Inflation effects.
  5. Opportunity costs.
  6. Probability of principal recovery.

The present-value analysis is particularly important because a dollar received twenty years in the future is worth substantially less than a dollar retained today. The mortality analysis is equally important because the economic value of an income annuity depends heavily upon surviving beyond the actuarial breakeven age.

The mathematical relationship may be illustrated as follows:

$

%

PMT is starting amount; r is rate; n is number of periods.

When mortality probabilities are incorporated into the present-value calculation, many participants may discover that:

  • They must survive substantially beyond normal life expectancy to realize positive economic value.
  • They face a meaningful probability of dying before recovering their principal.
  • Their heirs may receive little or nothing absent additional riders.
  • Riders designed to preserve principal often reduce income and increase costs.

These facts directly affect the participant’s economic decision. Therefore, these are material facts that are required to be disclosed to a plan’s particiapnts.

A reasonable participant might decide differently if informed that actuarial analysis indicates only a modest probability of achieving an economic breakeven, of recovering their original presence and additional retirement income payments. To quote Mark Twain, “I’m not so concerned about the income ON my money as I am the return OF my money.”

X. The “Knew or Should Have Known” Standard

Section 78(3) imposes an objective duty of disclosure. Plan fiduciaries selecting in-plan annuities frequently retain severeal types of experts, including, but not limited to,:

  • Attorneys.
  • Fiducairy risk management consultants.
  • Actuaries.
  • Insurance consultants.
  • Investment consultants.
  • Recordkeepers.
  • Insurance carriers.

These parties routinely possess mortality assumptions, pricing models, payout factors, and actuarial analyses.

A fiduciary therefore cannot plausibly claim ignorance of facts that reasonably should have been investigated during the annuity selection process. If a prudent investigation would reveal that many participants face unfavorable breakeven probabilities, the fiduciary “should have known” those facts. Once known, or reasonably knowable, Section 78(3) requires disclosure if those facts are material to participant decision-making.

XI. The Absence of Principal Protection

Many immediate and deferred income annuities require irrevocable annuitization.

The participant exchanges a liquid asset for a stream of payments contingent upon survival. Without refund features or death-benefit riders:

  • Remaining principal may be forfeited.
  • Beneficiaries may receive nothing.
  • The insurer retains the remaining economic value.

The availability of principal protection often requires:

  • Period-certain guarantees.
  • Refund provisions.
  • Death-benefit riders.

These protections frequently reduce monthly income or increase costs. As both the DOL and GAO have noted, over a twenty year peroid, each additional 1% in fees/costs reduces an investor’s end-return by approximately 17%.10 Thus the economic tradeoff between income guarantees and principal protection is itself material information.

A participant may reasonably conclude that a lower-yielding bond ladder, Treasury portfolio, CDs or systematic withdrawal strategy better satisfies their objectives if informed of these tradeoffs.

When Income Is Not Enough: Why the Continued Inclusion of In-Plan Annuities May Breach ERISA Duties When Compared to Capital-Preserving Income Alternatives and Strategies
In-Plan Annuities and Fiduciary Risk Management: Guaranteed Income vs. Commensurate Return

XIII. The Speculative Nature of Mortality Credits

Proponents of annuities frequently argue that “mortality credits” justify the economic value of lifetime income products. The theory is that individuals who die earlier than expected subsidize payments to individuals who survive longer than expected, thereby creating additional returns unavailable from conventional investments.

While mortality credits are a legitimate actuarial concept at the insurer’s pool level, their use in evaluating an individual participant’s expected benefit raises significant fiduciary disclosure concerns.

A. Mortality Credits Are Contingent Upon an Unknown Event

Unlike investment returns, interest payments, or bond coupons, mortality credits are not earned at a determinable rate. Their realization depends upon a single unknowable variable:The participant’s actual longevity.

No participant knows:

  • Whether they will survive to the actuarial breakeven age.
  • Whether they will survive long enough to receive meaningful mortality credits.
  • Whether they will die before recovering their principal.
  • Whether they will live sufficiently long to benefit from the experience of shorter-lived annuitants.

Consequently, mortality credits are not guaranteed returns. They are contingent benefits that become valuable only if a participant survives long enough to receive them.

B. Mortality Credits Exist at the Pool Level, Not the Individual Level

Insurers price annuities using population-level mortality assumptions.

The insurer knows that:

  • Some annuitants will die early.
  • Some will live exceptionally long.
  • The law of large numbers allows the insurer to predict aggregate experience.

The individual participant, however, experiences only one outcome. The participant either:

  1. Lives sufficiently long to benefit from mortality pooling; or
  2. Dies before receiving those benefits.

Thus, mortality credits that appear certain at the insurer level remain entirely uncertain at the participant level.

From the participant’s perspective, the alleged benefit remains speculative until longevity actually occurs.

C. Fiduciary Analysis Should Distinguish Between Guaranteed Payments and Speculative Benefits

A prudent breakeven analysis should separate:

  • Guaranteed contractual payments.
  • Return of principal.
  • Present-value calculations.
  • Speculative mortality benefits.

Combining these elements risks presenting uncertain future benefits as though they possess the same economic certainty as fixed income payments. A participant may reasonably believe:

“The annuity is expected to produce superior returns.”

When, in reality, the superior outcome may depend entirely upon surviving substantially beyond normal life expectancy. This distinction is material.

D. The Supreme Court’s Materiality Standard Supports Disclosure

Under TSC Industries and Basic, the question is whether a reasonable participant would consider information important.

A reasonable participant would likely consider it important to know:

  • That mortality credits are not guaranteed.
  • That they are contingent upon longevity.
  • That the participant may never realize them.
  • That economic breakeven may require survival well beyond average life expectancy.

Such information significantly alters the total mix of information available to the participant. Accordingly, the contingent nature of mortality credits itself constitutes material information.

E. The “Known or Should Have Known” Standard

Section 78(3) imposes a duty to disclose material information that fiduciaries knew or should have known.

Insurers, consultants, and fiduciary advisers routinely understand:

  • Mortality assumptions.
  • Breakeven ages.
  • Longevity probabilities.
  • Sensitivity analyses.
  • The dependence of mortality credits upon survival.

If fiduciaries know that the economic value of the annuity depends heavily upon longevity, participants may reasonably require that information to protect their interests. Failure to disclose that dependency may leave participants with an incomplete understanding of the risks and expected benefits.

F. Mortality Credits Are Better Viewed as Contingent Insurance Benefits

Mortality credits may therefore be more accurately characterized as contingent insurance benefits rather than investment returns.

They resemble:

  • Insurance proceeds contingent upon a covered event.
  • Longevity insurance.
  • Survival-contingent benefits.

Unlike interest or dividends, mortality credits cannot be independently earned, realized, or reinvested prior to the occurrence of the underlying contingency.Their value remains uncertain until the participant actually survives long enough to receive them.

Although mortality credits represent a legitimate actuarial concept at the pooled level, their use in individual participant analyses requires careful fiduciary treatment.

Because mortality credits:

  • Depend entirely upon uncertain longevity,
  • Cannot be guaranteed to any individual participant,
  • May never be realized,
  • Are unavailable to participants who die prematurely, and
  • Often determine whether an annuity ultimately produces economic value,

A legitimate argumnt can be made that their speculative nature constitutes material information under Section 78(3) of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts

XII. Loyalty Requires More Than Marketing Narratives

ERISA fiduciaries are not salespersons. They are fiduciaries.

The duty of loyalty prohibits presenting only favorable characteristics while omitting economically signif icant disadvantages.A communication emphasizing “Income you cannot outlive,while failing to disclose:

  • Low probabilities of economic breakeven,
  • Present-value losses,
  • Principal forfeiture risk,
  • Mortality dependence, or
  • Additional costs necessary to preserve principal,

may deprive participants of information necessary to protect their interests. Section 78(3) exists precisely to prevent such informational asymmetry.

Conclusion

ERISA plaintiff’s attorneys are increasingly adding fiduciary breach of duty claims based on the inadequacy or complete lack of necessary disclosures, as required under both ERISA Section 404(a) and Section 78(3) of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts.

What’s become increaisingly clear is that far too may plan sponsors are unaware of their disclosure resposibilities to plan participants, as well as the seriousness of the consequences for a failure to make the disclosures. The fiducairy duty to make the required duties is especially important with regard to in-plan annuities due to the complexity of the investment itself.

Applied to in-plan annuities, Section 78(3) of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts requires fiduciaries to disclose material information that they knew or should have known participants needed to protect their interests.

Under the Supreme Court’s materiality standards, information concerning:

  • Mortality-adjusted breakeven ages,
  • Present-value losses,
  • Probability of principal recovery,
  • Likelihood of achieving a commensurate return,
  • Costs of principal-protection riders, and
  • The possibility of forfeiting principal,

would frequently qualify as material because a reasonable participant would consider such information important in deciding whether to annuitize retirement assets.

The promise of lifetime income may be a benefit for some participants. But fiduciary law requires that participants receive mopre, that they the entire, complete economic picture. A fiduciary’s obligation is not merely to disclose the existence of a guarantee. It is to disclose the material facts necessary for participants to evaluate the value of that guarantee, thet they have sufficient infpormation to make an informed decision.

ERISA’s trust-law foundations, Section 78(3)’s affirmative duty of disclosure, and the Supreme Court’s objective materiality standards all point to the same conclusion: when fiduciaries know, or should know, that actuarial and economic analyses materially affect a participant’s decision to purchase an in-plan annuity, those facts must be disclosed. Silence is not neutrality. Under trust law, silence concerning material facts is itself a fiduciary act subject to judicial scrutiny.

Notes
1.Restatement (Third) of Trusts, Section 78(3). All rights reserved..
2.Varity Corp.v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996)(Varity)
3.Tibble v. Edison International, 575 U.S. 523, 528-30 (2015) (Tibble).
4.TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
5. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 435 U.S.224 (1988).
6. Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
7. Tibble, supra.
8. Hughes v. Northwestern University, 595 U.s. 170 (2022).
9. Restatement, Section78(3), supra.
10.Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, “Study of 401(k) Plan Fees and Expenses,” (DOL Study) http://www.DepartmentofLabor.gov/ebsa/pdf; “Private Pensions: Changes needed to Provide 401(k) Plan Participants and the Department of Labor Better Information on Fees,” (GAO Study).

© Copyright 2026 InvestSense, LLC. All rights reserved.

This article is for informational purposes only and is neither designed nor intended to provide legal, investment, or other professional advice since such advice always requires consideration of individual circumstances. If legal, investment, or other professional assistance is needed, the services of an attorney or other qulified professional advisor should be sought.

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Who’s Overseeing the DOL and EBSA? DOL FAB 2026-01’s Fatal Flaw Is Actually a Fiduciary Trap for Unwary Plan Sponsors

Posted on June 16, 2026 by jwatkins

James W. Watkins, III, J.D., CFP EmeritusTM, AWMA®
InvestSense, LLC

APPELLATE CLOSING ARGUMENT OPPOSING FAB 2026-01

May it please the Court:

At its core, this case presents a simple but critically consequential question:

Can the Department of Labor lawfully encourage fiduciaries to rely upon opaque, highly complex, and often commission-driven investment structures when ERISA expressly requires fiduciaries to conduct an independent and objective investigation of every investment option offered to plan participants?

The answer is no.

FAB 2026-01 {FAB} rests upon an assumption fundamentally at odds with ERISA’s fiduciary framework. The FAB repeatedly suggests that fiduciaries may satisfy their obligations through process-oriented reliance upon service providers, consultants, product manufacturers, and other market participants. Yet ERISA §404(a) imposes a duty far more demanding. A fiduciary must engage in an independent investigation and objective evaluation sufficient to determine whether an investment is prudent and in the best interests of participants.

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Gregg v. Transportation Workers of America International1, 343 F.3d 833 (6th Cir. 2003), demonstrates precisely why FAB 2026-01 cannot be reconciled with ERISA. There, the court rejected the notion that fiduciaries may simply rely upon recommendations from individuals whose compensation and incentives are tied to the sale of the very products under consideration. The court emphasized that “one extremely important factor is whether the expert advisor truly offers independent and impartial advice.” The court further recognized that a broker compensated through commissions is not an objective analyst because such a person possesses a financial incentive to consummate transactions rather than provide disinterested fiduciary guidance. The Sixth Circuit accordingly held that reliance upon conflicted advisors could not automatically satisfy ERISA’s fiduciary obligations.

That principle is fatal to the reasoning underlying FAB 2026-01. The investments promoted or facilitated under the FAB frequently involve private markets, alternative assets, structured vehicles, insurance products, collective investment arrangements, proprietary valuation methodologies, layered fee structures, and complex risk-transfer mechanisms. These products are characterized not by transparency but by opacity. They often depend upon assumptions, internal valuations, proprietary algorithms, illiquid markets, and information unavailable to plan sponsors and participants alike.

The practical consequence is unavoidable: the more complex and opaque the investment, the more dependent the fiduciary becomes upon the very parties selling, managing, valuing, or promoting the product. That dependency is precisely what Gregg warned against.

A fiduciary cannot conduct an independent investigation when critical information is unavailable for independent verification. A fiduciary cannot objectively evaluate an investment when the underlying valuation methodology is proprietary. A fiduciary cannot meaningfully assess costs, risks, liquidity constraints, or expected performance when those elements are disclosed only through the representations of interested parties. And a fiduciary cannot satisfy ERISA’s duty of prudence merely by documenting meetings, collecting presentations, and recording procedural steps if the substantive information necessary for independent evaluation remains inaccessible.

Indeed, FAB 2026-01 creates a paradox that the Department never addresses .ERISA §404(a) requires independent investigation. The products contemplated by FAB 2026-01 often require reliance on information controlled by interested market participants. The greater the opacity of the investment, the less capable the fiduciary becomes of conducting the independent investigation ERISA demands. Thus, the very characteristics of these products make compliance with §404(a) increasingly difficult and, in many circumstances, practically impossible.

The Department attempts to solve this problem by elevating procedure over substance. But neither trust law nor Supreme Court precedent permits such a substitution.

ERISA derives directly from the common law of trusts. Under trust law, prudence is not established by the mere appearance of diligence. A trustee’s process has value only insofar as it leads to a prudent substantive decision based upon reliable and adequately investigated information. A checklist cannot transform unknowable facts into known facts. Documentation cannot cure informational asymmetry. Procedure cannot eliminate conflicts of interest.

The informational asymmetry inherent in many alternative and proprietary investment products is especially troubling because it prevents meaningful verification. Plan sponsors must ultimately rely upon the representations of those who design, sell, manage, value, and profit from the investments. Participants face an even greater disadvantage. They lack access to the underlying data, valuation assumptions, risk models, and compensation arrangements necessary to independently assess the prudence of the investments selected on their behalf.

The result is a fiduciary regime increasingly dependent upon trust in market intermediaries rather than independent fiduciary judgment. That is not what Congress enacted.

ERISA was designed to impose the highest duties known to the law. Those duties require fiduciaries to act as skeptical investigators, not passive recipients of sales presentations. They require objective evaluation, not deference to product sponsors. They require verification, not assumption.

The Sixth Circuit recognized in Gregg that reliance upon conflicted advisors cannot substitute for independent fiduciary judgment. The same principle applies with even greater force here, where the products themselves are so complex that independent verification may be unattainable. If fiduciaries cannot independently investigate and evaluate the investment, then they cannot establish that the investment satisfies ERISA’s prudence requirements. No amount of procedural documentation can alter that reality.

Ultimately, FAB 2026-01 asks fiduciaries to navigate a world in which critical information is controlled by interested parties, independent verification is often unavailable, and substantive prudence is presumed from procedural effort. That approach reverses ERISA’s design. It shifts the focus from whether an investment is objectively prudent to whether a fiduciary can document a process surrounding information it cannot independently verify.

The statute demands more.

The common law of trusts demands more.

Gregg demands more.

For these reasons, the Court should reject the reasoning embodied in FAB 2026-01 and reaffirm that ERISA §404(a) requires what it has always required: a genuinely independent, objective, and substantively meaningful investigation of every investment option offered to plan participants—an obligation that cannot be satisfied through reliance upon conflicted sources, opaque products, or procedural formalities divorced from verifiable facts.

Our argument is particularly strong when paired with the precedent established by the decisions in Donovan v. Bierwirth2, Tibble v. Edison International3, Hughes v. Northwestern University4, and Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo5, because together those authorities reinforce that ERISA fiduciary duties are grounded in trust-law principles, require substantive prudence rather than mere procedural compliance, and are not subject to agency reinterpretation that departs from the statute’s common-law foundations. Henry Friendly’s requirement of a “careful and impartial investigation,” quoted favorably in Gregg, is especially useful because it directly links independent investigation to the fiduciary duty of prudence.

A FAILURE TO CONDUCT AN INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION CONSTITUTES A PER SE VIOLATION OF ERISA’S PRUDENCE REQUIREMENT AND FURTHER DEMONSTRATES THE LEGAL DEFICIENCIES OF FAB 2026-01

The fundamental defect in FAB 2026-01 is not merely that it encourages fiduciaries to consider investment products characterized by substantial opacity, valuation uncertainty, and informational asymmetry. The FAB’s more profound legal flaw is that it effectively diminishes ERISA’s threshold requirement that fiduciaries conduct an independent investigation and evaluation before selecting or retaining plan investments.

Federal courts have repeatedly recognized that the duty to investigate is not a subsidiary component of prudence; rather, it is the essential predicate to any determination that an investment decision is prudent. Where a fiduciary fails to conduct the investigation required by ERISA § 404(a), the fiduciary commits a breach of duty irrespective of whether the investment subsequently performs well or poorly.

As the Second Circuit explained in Liss v. Smith6:

“The test of prudence is one of conduct, and not a test of the result of performance of the investment.”

The court further emphasized that fiduciaries must undertake an independent inquiry appropriate to the circumstances before making investment decisions. The fiduciary’s obligation is not satisfied by reliance upon assumptions, representations, or post hoc justifications. Rather, prudence requires a process capable of producing an informed decision.

Similarly, in Bussian v. RJR Nabisco, Inc7., the Fifth Circuit held that:

“The court’s task is to inquire whether the individual trustees, at the time they engaged in the challenged transactions, employed the appropriate methods to investigate the merits of the investment and to structure the investment.”

The Fifth Circuit further explained that a fiduciary’s failure to engage in an adequate investigation itself constitutes imprudence, regardless of the eventual outcome of the investment decision. Prudence is measured at the moment of decision-making, not through hindsight and not through subsequent performance.

These principles derive directly from trust law and have been repeatedly recognized throughout ERISA jurisprudence. Courts consistently hold that a fiduciary who fails to investigate cannot later justify the decision by pointing to favorable outcomes, nor can procedural formalities substitute for the substantive inquiry required by law.

This principle is especially significant in the context of FAB 2026-01. The FAB contemplates investment products whose complexity, illiquidity, proprietary valuation methodologies, layered fee structures, and limited transparency frequently prevent plan fiduciaries from independently verifying the information necessary to evaluate prudence. In many instances, fiduciaries must necessarily rely upon information generated by the very entities that manufacture, manage, value, market, or profit from the investment products.

The problem is not merely one of potential conflict. The problem is that such dependence may render the independent investigation required by ERISA impossible as a practical matter.

Under Liss, Bussian, and numerous related authorities, the inability to perform an independent investigation is itself legally consequential. If a fiduciary lacks sufficient information to independently evaluate an investment’s risks, costs, liquidity constraints, valuation methodology, and expected performance characteristics, then the fiduciary cannot satisfy the duty of prudence imposed by ERISA § 404(a). The breach occurs at that point.

The fiduciary need not select a demonstrably inferior investment.

The fiduciary need not cause immediate losses.

The fiduciary need not act in bad faith.

The failure to undertake the investigation required by ERISA constitutes the violation.

This principle is consistent with the foundational decision in Donovan v. Bierwirth,8 where the Second Circuit Court of Appealsheld that fiduciaries must employ the care, skill, prudence, and diligence of a prudent person acting in a like capacity and must conduct a thorough and impartial investigation before acting.

Likewise, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that ERISA fiduciary duties are derived from the common law of trusts and require fiduciaries to engage in a reasoned and informed decision-making process9: Taken together, these authorities establish a straightforward proposition:

A fiduciary who cannot independently investigate an investment cannot establish that the investment is prudent.

A fiduciary who does not independently investigate an investment violates ERISA.

And an agency interpretation that implicitly encourages fiduciaries to proceed despite informational barriers that prevent such investigation cannot be reconciled with ERISA’s statutory framework.

Accordingly, FAB 2026-01 suffers from a defect that extends beyond mere policy disagreement. The FAB 2026-01 effectively normalizes circumstances in which fiduciaries may be unable to perform the very investigation that courts have repeatedly identified as a prerequisite to prudent decision-making.

Under Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo10, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), courts must exercise independent judgment in determining the meaning of statutes and need not defer to agency interpretations that conflict with the governing law.

Because FAB 2026-01 cannot be reconciled with ERISA’s statutory text, trust-law foundations, and the extensive body of precedent requiring an independent fiduciary investigation, the Bulletin is not merely unpersuasive. It is legally incompatible with the standards governing fiduciary conduct under ERISA and therefore should be afforded no weight in judicial proceedings.

The Court should reject any suggestion that procedural documentation, reliance upon conflicted sources, or acceptance of unverifiable information can substitute for the independent investigation and evaluation required by ERISA § 404(a). The case law demonstrates that such failures constitute fiduciary breaches at the moment they occur, rendering FAB 2026-01 fundamentally inconsistent with governing law, effectively a fiduciary breach trap for plan sponsors.

In summation:

“FAB 2026-01 assumes that fiduciaries may prudently select investments whose complexity and opacity prevent meaningful independent verification. Yet Bussian, Liss, Donovan, and their progeny establish the opposite rule: where a fiduciary cannot perform the investigation required by ERISA § 404(a), prudence cannot be established. The failure to investigate is not merely evidence of imprudence—it is the breach itself. An agency bulletin premised upon circumstances that frustrate the very investigation ERISA requires cannot be reconciled with the statute and therefore merits no judicial consideration under Loper Bright.”

Notes
1. Gregg v. Transportation Workers of America International1, 343 F.3d 833 (6th Cir. 2003).
2. Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263 (E.D.N.Y 1981).
3. Tibble v. Edison International, 575 U.S. 523, 528–30 (2015)
4. Hughes v. Northwestern University, 595 U.S. 170, 175–77 (2022)
5. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024).
6. Liss v. Smith, 991 F. Supp. 278, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), aff’d, 211 F.3d 697 (2d Cir. 2000).
7. Bussian v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 223 F.3d 286, 299–300 (5th Cir. 2000).
8. Bierwirth, supra.
9. Tibble, supra; Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 419–21 (2014); Hughes, supra.
10. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo,

© Copyright 2026 InvestSense, LLC. All rights reserved

This article is for informational purposes only and is neither designed nor intended to provide legal, investment, or other professional advice since such advice always requires consideration of individual circumstances. If legal, investment, or other professional assistance is needed, the services of an attorney or other qulified professional advisor should be sought.

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May It Please The Court: THE EBSA’s Legally Unsupported, Unfounded, and Bootstrapped Policies Create a Systemic Threat to Plan Participants and Plan Sponsors Alike and Must Be Rejected

Posted on May 26, 2026 by jwatkins

James W. Watkins, III, J.D., CFP EmeritusTM, AWMA®
InvestSense, LLC

The issue before this Court is not whether procedural prudence matters under ERISA. It unquestionably does. The issue is whether the Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA) may lawfully transform procedural prudence from an evidentiary consideration into a substitute for fiduciary prudence itself. That proposition is not merely unsupported. It is irreconcilable with ERISA’s text, the law of trusts, and decades of controlling judicial precedent.

The EBSA’s current position rests upon a fundamentally unstable premise — a legal “house of cards” constructed by incrementally extrapolating beyond what courts have actually held. The agency begins with a legitimate proposition: fiduciaries must employ a prudent process. But it then extends that proposition far beyond recognition, asserting in substance that the existence of a procedurally elaborate process is itself sufficient to establish fiduciary prudence, irrespective of whether the resulting decision was objectively reasonable, loyal, or substantively defensible. That leap finds no support in ERISA, trust law, or Supreme Court jurisprudence.

ERISA does not impose a mere paperwork standard. Congress enacted a fiduciary regime grounded in substantive protection of plan participants and beneficiaries. Section 404(a)(1)(B) requires fiduciaries to act “with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing” that a prudent person would use in a like capacity. That language incorporates both method and outcome-oriented reasonableness. A fiduciary process is relevant because it helps determine whether the fiduciary actually acted prudently — not because process itself magically converts imprudent conduct into prudent conduct.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly treated procedural prudence as evidence of prudence, not as prudence per se. In Tibble v. Edison International1, the Court emphasized the continuing duty to monitor investments under trust-law principles. The Court did not suggest that a fiduciary could satisfy that duty merely by documenting meetings, retaining consultants, or following internal protocols while ignoring objectively unreasonable outcomes. To the contrary, Tibble reaffirmed that ERISA fiduciary obligations derive from trust law — a body of law that has never equated procedural formality with substantive prudence.

Likewise, in Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer2, the Court rejected special presumptions insulating fiduciaries from substantive review. The Court instead demanded context-sensitive judicial scrutiny of fiduciary conduct. That framework is fundamentally incompatible with the EBSA’s apparent effort to create a de facto safe harbor based solely upon procedural ritualism.

Most importantly, the Supreme Court’s recent administrative law jurisprudence forecloses the degree of interpretive elasticity the EBSA now seeks to employ. Under Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo3, agencies are not entitled to deference merely because they advance a plausible policy preference. Courts must independently determine the best reading of the statute. And the best reading of ERISA does not permit an agency to collapse substantive fiduciary review into a checklist-driven procedural exercise.

Indeed, the majority of federal circuit courts have consistently recognized that fiduciary prudence under ERISA contains both procedural and substantive dimensions. Courts routinely examine whether fiduciaries engaged in a reasoned process, but they also examine whether the resulting decisions were objectively reasonable under prevailing circumstances. The two inquiries are interconnected but distinct.

The EBSA’s contrary position attempts to erase that distinction altogether.

Under the agency’s apparent framework, a fiduciary could:

  • retain expensive and underperforming investments indefinitely,
  • ignore materially superior alternatives,
  • impose excessive costs upon participants,
  • or structure portfolios in ways inconsistent with accepted investment principles,

yet still claim prudence merely because committees met regularly, minutes were recorded, consultants were retained, and procedural boxes were checked.

That is not fiduciary law. That is administrative formalism masquerading as fiduciary protection.

Even more troubling, the EBSA’s position effectively institutionalizes a form of legally sanctioned willful blindness.

Under traditional trust principles, a fiduciary cannot deliberately avoid confronting evidence that its decisions are harming beneficiaries. A trustee may not shield itself behind process while consciously disregarding substantive warning signs. Yet the EBSA’s approach incentivizes precisely that behavior. So long as fiduciaries can demonstrate that meetings occurred and procedures were followed, they are tacitly encouraged not to ask the harder substantive questions:

  • Are participants actually receiving prudent investment options?
  • Are fees objectively excessive relative to available alternatives?
  • Are persistent underperformance patterns being meaningfully addressed?
  • Are fiduciaries evaluating economic realities, or merely preserving litigation defenses?

A regime that rewards procedural insulation while discouraging substantive inquiry creates a dangerous moral hazard. Fiduciaries become incentivized to cultivate plausible deniability rather than genuine prudence. The resulting process ceases to function as a tool for protecting participants and instead becomes a mechanism for avoiding accountability.

That is the essence of willful blindness: constructing systems designed not to discover imprudence.

And courts have repeatedly rejected analogous attempts in other legal contexts to substitute formal compliance mechanisms for actual substantive responsibility. The law does not permit actors to avoid liability by intentionally narrowing their field of vision. ERISA fiduciaries should not become the sole exception to that foundational principle.

Trust law has never tolerated such a result. A trustee who carefully documents an irrational decision does not become prudent by virtue of documentation alone. Nor does a fiduciary become prudent by deliberately refusing to confront evidence inconsistent with a preferred narrative of compliance. Process matters because it tends to produce prudent decisions. But when process becomes detached from substantive reasonableness, it degenerates into empty ceremony — or worse, into a sophisticated form of institutionalized indifference.

The danger of the EBSA’s position is therefore not merely doctrinal. It is systemic.

By elevating procedural optics above substantive participant outcomes, the agency creates perverse incentives throughout the retirement system. Fiduciaries become incentivized to maximize defensibility rather than participant welfare — to generate committee records instead of investment value, to prioritize consultant memoranda over economic reality, and to engage in defensive bureaucracy rather than genuine fiduciary stewardship.

That approach undermines the very purpose of ERISA.

Congress enacted ERISA because participants lacked the expertise and leverage necessary to protect themselves against imprudent fiduciary conduct. The statute was designed to impose meaningful fiduciary accountability — not to create a litigation-resistant compliance theater in which process alone immunizes objectively harmful decisions.

Nor can the EBSA evade this problem by characterizing substantive review as impermissible hindsight. Courts are fully capable of distinguishing between prohibited hindsight bias and legitimate evaluation of objective prudence. Federal courts have done so for decades. The existence of market uncertainty does not eliminate the requirement that fiduciary decisions possess a rational substantive foundation when made.

The EBSA’s position also produces a profound logical contradiction. If procedural prudence alone establishes fiduciary prudence, then substantive prudence effectively disappears from ERISA altogether. Yet ERISA’s statutory language does not distinguish between procedural prudence and substantive prudence because the statute contemplates both as components of a unified fiduciary obligation. The agency’s interpretation therefore impermissibly rewrites the statute by excising substantive accountability from fiduciary review.

This Court should reject that effort.

An agency cannot manufacture legal authority through repetition. It cannot bootstrap a novel fiduciary theory from selective quotations stripped of their doctrinal context. And it cannot convert isolated judicial references to “process” into a wholesale abandonment of substantive fiduciary review when neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has authorized such a transformation.

At bottom, the EBSA’s position is unstable because it lacks the essential structural support that legitimate legal doctrines require:

  • no textual foundation in ERISA,
  • no grounding in traditional trust law,
  • no endorsement from the Supreme Court,
  • no meaningful consensus among the federal circuits,
  • and no principled answer to the obvious danger of willful blindness inherent in its framework.

Without those supports, the theory collapses under its own weight.

It is, in every meaningful sense, a house of cards.

And because ERISA exists to protect plan participants rather than bureaucratic abstractions, this Court should decline the invitation to replace genuine fiduciary prudence with procedural symbolism. The law requires more than documented process. It requires fiduciaries to act prudently in substance, loyally in purpose, and reasonably under the circumstances actually confronting them.

Anything less would reduce ERISA’s fiduciary protections from a substantive safeguard into a merely procedural illusion

Notes
1. Tibble v. Edison, 575 U.S. 523 (2015).
2. Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 573 U.S. 409 (2014).
3. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024).

© Copyright 2026 InvestSense, LLC. All rights reserved

This article is for informational purposes only and is neither designed nor intended to provide legal, investment, or other professional advice since such advice always requires consideration of individual circumstances. If legal, investment, or other professional assistance is needed, the services of an attorney or other qulified professional advisor should be sought.

.

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A Call for Senate Oversight Hearings: The Systemic Risk to Plan Sponsors and Plan Participants Created by the EBSA’s Expansive and Legally Unsupported Extrapolations of ERISA Fiduciary Principles

Posted on May 24, 2026 by jwatkins

James W. Watkins, III, J.D., CFP EmeritusTM, AWMA®
InvestSense, LLC

Employee Benefits Security Administration (“EBSA”) may not transform generally accepted fiduciary concepts into categorical legal mandates untethered from statutory text, judicial precedent, or established trust-law principles.

This appeal presents a fundamental question concerning the permissible boundaries of administrative interpretation under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”): whether the Employee Benefits Security Administration (“EBSA”) may transform generally accepted fiduciary concepts into categorical legal mandates untethered from statutory text, judicial precedent, or established trust-law principles.

The answer is no.

The EBSA’s emerging modus operandi reflects a recurring pattern of regulatory overextrapolation whereby narrow, context-dependent judicial observations are elevated into rigid doctrinal propositions. This phenomenon is particularly evident in the agency’s treatment of “procedural prudence.” While courts have long recognized procedural prudence as an important evidentiary component of fiduciary conduct, the EBSA has increasingly suggested—either explicitly or functionally—that adherence to procedural formalities alone is sufficient to establish fiduciary prudence under ERISA.

That position is irreconcilable with ERISA jurisprudence.

The governing case law uniformly establishes that fiduciary prudence under ERISA contains both procedural and substantive dimensions. A prudent process is relevant because it is evidence bearing on the ultimate question of prudence—not because process itself constitutes prudence as a matter of law. The distinction is critical. By collapsing substantive prudence into mere procedural formalism, the EBSA effectively substitutes bureaucratic box-checking for genuine fiduciary accountability.

The consequences are severe.

For plan sponsors, the EBSA’s approach creates regulatory uncertainty, increased litigation exposure, distorted fiduciary incentives, and compliance regimes divorced from actual participant welfare. For participants, the approach risks legitimizing economically harmful investment decisions merely because fiduciaries can demonstrate the existence of a superficially documented process.

ERISA was enacted to protect retirement security, not to create a safe harbor for imprudent outcomes cloaked in procedural ritualism.

Under modern administrative law principles, including the Supreme Court’s rejection of reflexive agency deference in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, courts must independently determine whether the EBSA’s interpretations are consistent with statutory text, trust-law principles, and binding precedent. The EBSA’s procedural-prudence-only framework fails that inquiry.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Whether the EBSA exceeds its lawful interpretive authority under ERISA by extrapolating the generally accepted principle that procedural prudence is relevant to fiduciary analysis into the unsupported proposition that procedural prudence alone is sufficient to establish fiduciary prudence, notwithstanding longstanding precedent requiring both procedural and substantive prudence.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Questions involving statutory interpretation, the scope of agency authority, and the legal meaning of fiduciary obligations under ERISA are reviewed de novo.

Following Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, courts are no longer required to defer reflexively to agency interpretations merely because statutory ambiguity exists. Rather, courts must exercise independent judgment in determining the best interpretation of the statute.

Accordingly, the EBSA’s interpretive assertions regarding fiduciary prudence are entitled only to the persuasive weight justified by their reasoning, consistency, and fidelity to ERISA’s statutory framework and common-law trust principles

ARGUMENT

I. ERISA FIDUCIARY PRUDENCE HAS ALWAYS REQUIRED BOTH PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE PRUDENCE

ERISA’s fiduciary framework derives substantially from traditional trust law. Section 404(a)(1)(B) requires fiduciaries to act:

“with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use.”

This language imposes a duty concerning conduct and outcomes alike.

Courts consistently recognize that procedural prudence is important because it provides evidence regarding whether fiduciaries acted prudently. But courts have never held that procedural compliance itself conclusively establishes prudence.

Indeed, the entire structure of ERISA litigation presupposes that procedural evidence is probative rather than dispositive.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer emphasized careful context-sensitive scrutiny of fiduciary decision-making, not blind reliance on procedural formalities. Likewise, Tibble v. Edison International reaffirmed that fiduciaries possess a continuing duty to monitor investments substantively, not merely to document periodic review procedures.

Numerous circuit courts similarly have rejected the notion that process alone immunizes fiduciaries from liability. Courts routinely examine:

  1. The economic substance of fiduciary decisions;
  2. The reasonableness of fees;
  3. Comparative performance;
  4. Risk-adjusted characteristics;
  5. Availability of superior alternatives;
  6. Participant impact; and
  7. Long-term economic consequences.

Such inquiries would be legally irrelevant if procedural prudence alone established fiduciary compliance.

The EBSA’s apparent extrapolation therefore conflicts directly with the judicial understanding of prudence as an integrated substantive and procedural standard.

II. THE EBSA’S EXTRAPOLATION CONSTITUTES IMPROPER ADMINISTRATIVE BOOTSTRAPPING

The agency’s reasoning reflects a classic form of administrative bootstrapping.

The original proposition—that procedural prudence is relevant evidence of fiduciary prudence—is uncontroversial. From that modest premise, however, the EBSA appears to infer progressively broader conclusions:

  1. Procedural prudence is important;
  2. Therefore procedural prudence is primary;
  3. Therefore procedural prudence is presumptively sufficient;
  4. Therefore substantive review becomes secondary or unnecessary.

Each inferential step departs further from established law.

This interpretive inflation mirrors the precise administrative excesses modern separation-of-powers jurisprudence seeks to prevent. Agencies may clarify statutory obligations; they may not manufacture novel legal standards by exaggerating isolated concepts beyond their logical and legal limits.

ERISA nowhere states that fiduciary prudence may be satisfied through procedural documentation alone. Nor has any controlling court adopted such a principle.

The EBSA’s approach effectively rewrites ERISA’s prudence requirement into a “reasonable paperwork” standard.

But ERISA protects retirement assets, not administrative appearances.

A fiduciary who meticulously documents a catastrophically imprudent investment decision has not fulfilled ERISA’s fiduciary obligations merely because meeting minutes exist.

Likewise, a fiduciary cannot satisfy the duty of prudence by engaging consultants, holding committee meetings, or generating extensive reports if the underlying investment decisions remain objectively unreasonable relative to participant interests.

To conclude otherwise would sever fiduciary law from economic reality.

III. THE EBSA’S POSITION IS INCONSISTENT WITH TRUST-LAW FOUNDATIONS UNDERLYING ERISA

ERISA fiduciary duties are informed by the common law of trusts. Traditional trust law never treated procedure as a substitute for substantive prudence.

The prudent-investor rule evaluates whether fiduciaries exercised reasonable judgment in pursuing beneficiary interests under prevailing circumstances. Process matters because it informs the reliability of fiduciary judgment—not because it independently satisfies fiduciary obligations irrespective of substantive consequences.

The Restatement principles underlying modern fiduciary law repeatedly emphasize that fiduciaries must act reasonably in light of risk, return, diversification, preservation of capital, and beneficiary objectives.

Under trust law:

  • A carefully documented imprudent investment remains imprudent;
  • A formally reviewed excessive-fee arrangement remains excessive;
  • A procedurally vetted economically irrational strategy remains irrational.

The EBSA’s procedural formalism therefore represents a departure not only from ERISA precedent but from the trust-law heritage Congress incorporated into ERISA itself.

IV. THE EBSA’S APPROACH CREATES SYSTEMIC RISKS FOR PLAN SPONSORS

The agency’s framework creates profound practical and legal instability for plan sponsors.

A. It Encourages Defensive Bureaucracy Rather Than Genuine Prudence

If procedural documentation becomes the primary determinant of prudence, fiduciaries are incentivized to prioritize process optics over substantive participant outcomes.

This creates a culture of defensive compliance characterized by:

  • excessive consultant reliance;
  • overdocumentation;
  • procedural redundancy;
  • checkbox governance; and
  • litigation-oriented record creation.

Such conduct increases plan costs without necessarily improving participant welfare.

B. It Increases Litigation Exposure Through Regulatory Ambiguity

The EBSA’s shifting and expansive interpretations create substantial uncertainty concerning what fiduciaries must actually do to satisfy ERISA obligations.

Plan sponsors face a paradoxical environment where:

  • formal procedures may be deemed sufficient during investigations,
    yet
  • plaintiffs may still challenge substantive outcomes in litigation.

This inconsistency produces precisely the unpredictability ERISA was intended to avoid.

C. It Distorts Investment Decision-Making

A process-centric regime may discourage fiduciaries from considering innovative or participant-beneficial investment structures if such structures deviate from conventional procedural templates.

Fiduciaries may instead default toward “litigation-safe” decisions rather than economically superior decisions.

That distortion harms retirement outcomes.

V. THE GREATEST RISKS FALL UPON PLAN PARTICIPANTS

The ultimate victims of procedural formalism are plan participants.

ERISA exists to protect beneficiaries’ retirement security, purchasing power, and long-term financial welfare. A framework that elevates process above substance undermines those objectives.

Under the EBSA’s apparent approach, participants could suffer substantial economic harm while fiduciaries remain insulated because procedural artifacts exist demonstrating meetings, reviews, and consultant involvement.

Such a regime creates the dangerous possibility that:

  • excessive fees become defensible if periodically reviewed;
  • underperforming investments become acceptable if monitored;
  • capital-destructive strategies become protected if documented.

This transforms fiduciary prudence from a substantive duty of loyalty and care into an exercise in administrative self-protection.

ERISA does not tolerate such a result.

VI. MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REQUIRES REJECTION OF THE EBSA’S OVEREXPANSIVE INTERPRETATIONS

Under Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, courts must independently determine statutory meaning rather than defer automatically to agency preferences.

The EBSA’s procedural-prudence-only extrapolation warrants little persuasive weight because it:

  1. conflicts with statutory text;
  2. conflicts with trust-law principles;
  3. conflicts with longstanding precedent;
  4. produces economically irrational outcomes;
  5. expands agency authority without congressional authorization; and
  6. undermines ERISA’s participant-protection purposes.

Moreover, the Supreme Court’s recent administrative-law jurisprudence repeatedly warns against agency efforts to discover transformative powers in vague statutory language.

The EBSA’s attempt to redefine fiduciary prudence through interpretive escalation is precisely the type of administrative overreach courts are now obligated to scrutinize skeptically.

CONCLUSION

The EBSA’s current interpretive trajectory reflects an increasingly problematic pattern of regulatory overextrapolation whereby modest and generally accepted legal principles are transformed into sweeping doctrinal assertions unsupported by statutory text, trust law, or judicial precedent.

Exhibit A is the agency’s apparent suggestion that procedural prudence alone may establish fiduciary prudence under ERISA.

That proposition is legally indefensible.

ERISA fiduciary prudence has always required a synthesis of procedural and substantive prudence. Process is evidence—not destiny. Documentation is relevant—not dispositive. Administrative ritual cannot substitute for genuine fiduciary judgment directed toward participant welfare.

By elevating procedural formalism above substantive fiduciary accountability, the EBSA exposes plan sponsors to regulatory confusion, increased litigation risk, distorted incentives, and unnecessary compliance burdens while simultaneously exposing participants to economically harmful fiduciary decisions shielded by superficial procedural compliance.

The Senate HELP committee should reject the EBSA’s unsupported extrapolations and reaffirm that ERISA fiduciary prudence remains grounded in both procedural integrity and substantive reasonableness, consistent with statutory text, trust-law principles, and longstanding jurisprudence, and require the EBSA to act accordingly going forward,

© Copyright 2026 InvestSense, LLC. All rights reserved

This article is for informational purposes only and is neither designed nor intended to provide legal, investment, or other professional advice since such advice always requires consideration of individual circumstances. If legal, investment, or other professional assistance is needed, the services of an attorney or other qulified professional advisor should be sought.

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DOL/EBSA Field Assistance Bulletin 2026-01 Is Not Entitled to Judicial Deference Under The Loper Bright Decision

Posted on May 18, 2026 by jwatkins

James W. Watkins, III, J.D., CFP EmeritusTM, AWMA®
InvestSense, LLC

In DOL/EBSA Field Assitance Bulletin 2026-01 (FAB 2026-01), the Department of Labor states its belief that its proposed legislation is entitled to legal deference. Nothing could be further from the truth. FAB 2026-01 is based on an administrative construct that is neither grounded in ERISA’s text nor supported by the governing body of fiduciary jurisprudence. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo1, courts no longer yield interpretive authority merely because an agency advances a preferred policy outcome. The judiciary—not the agency—is charged with saying what the law is. And when the agency’s interpretation is inconsistent with statutory text, trust-law principles, and controlling precedent, no deference is warranted.

FAB 2026-01 fails that test at every level.

At its core, FAB 2026-01 is constructed upon a fundamentally misleading and legally unsupported premise: that fiduciary prudence under ERISA may be established—or defeated—solely through evidence of “procedural prudence,” divorced from substantive outcomes and objective economic reality. But that proposition is not the law. It has never been the law.

ERISA fiduciary jurisprudence has consistently recognized that prudence contains both procedural and substantive dimensions. Fiduciaries must employ a prudent process, but courts also examine whether that process produced decisions consistent with the interests of participants and beneficiaries. The statute itself imposes a duty to act “with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence” that a prudent fiduciary would exercise under like circumstances, which necessarily encompasses both method and result.2

The Supreme Court’s decisions in Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer3 and Hughes v. Northwestern University4 do not reduce prudence to a procedural checklist. Nor did the Second Circuit in Donovan v. Bierwirth5 hold that fiduciaries may satisfy ERISA merely by documenting a process untethered from substantive participant welfare. To the contrary, Bierwirth emphasized that courts must determine whether fiduciaries acted with “complete and undivided loyalty” and with the care of prudent persons managing another’s property—not whether fiduciaries merely generated paperwork sufficient to survive scrutiny.

The EBSA’s contrary theory is therefore not an interpretation of existing law; it is an attempt to rewrite it.

And the agency’s effort is especially problematic because the Bulletin repeatedly invokes “clearly established case law” while simultaneously advancing propositions that no federal appellate court has actually endorsed. The internal contradiction is glaring. The agency cannot claim fidelity to settled precedent while constructing an enforcement framework around a theory that lacks meaningful judicial support.

Indeed, FAB 2026-01s analytical architecture appears substantially derived from advocacy-oriented commentary advanced in blog posts and litigation-position papers associated with Mr. Aronowitz and his former fiduciary insurance firm, rather than from neutral judicial precedent. Yet the Bulletin presents these contested advocacy positions as though they represent settled federal law. That omission is material. Agencies are not free to launder private litigation theories into quasi-regulatory authority while obscuring the advocacy origins of those theories.

Even more troubling is FAB 2026-01’s overt attempt to invade the exclusive province of the judiciary and to circumvent the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

FAB 2601-01 repeatedly frames ERISA litigation through the lens of “frivolous litigation” and advocates for heightened barriers to discovery and pleading standards designed to terminate cases before factual development may occur. But those matters are governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and by Article III courts—not by administrative preference.

Neither the DOL nor the the EBSA possesses authority to create a shadow procedural regime for ERISA cases.

Whether a complaint survives dismissal is governed by Rules 8, 12, and the controlling precedents interpreting those rules. Whether discovery is appropriate is governed by Rules 26 through 37 and by judicial supervision. The Executive branch cannot, through interpretive bulletins, predetermine merits outcomes by restricting litigants’ access to discovery or by imposing extra-statutory evidentiary burdens before plaintiffs have any opportunity to obtain fiduciary records uniquely within defendants’ possession.

That concern is particularly acute in ERISA litigation, where the relevant information regarding fiduciary deliberations, fee negotiations, benchmarking practices, revenue sharing, and investment monitoring is almost always controlled exclusively by defendants.

FAB 2026-01 thus attempts to accomplish indirectly what the agency could never accomplish directly: judicial merits adjudication without judicial process.

And respected jurists across the ideological spectrum have already warned against precisely this kind of procedural distortion.

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson has repeatedly cautioned against converting pleading standards into premature merits determinations that deny plaintiffs meaningful access to adjudication. Sixth Circui Judge Jeffrey Sutton has similarly emphasized that federal courts must not impose heightened procedural barriers untethered from the Federal Rules themselves. And Judge Sidney H. Stein has recognized the importance of factual development in complex ERISA fiduciary litigation, particularly where fiduciary decision-making cannot be fairly evaluated absent discovery.

FAB 2026-01 disregards those warnings entirely, furher evidencing the EBSA’s pattern of willful blindness in order to promote and protect the interests of plan sponsors and the indsurance industry, rather then follow ERISA’s mandate and to protect and protect the best interests of plan participants and their beneficiaries

Under Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo5, courts must exercise independent judgment when determining the meaning of statutes. Agencies are entitled at most to persuasive respect proportional to the quality of their reasoning. But reasoning built upon selective precedent, litigation-driven advocacy theories, and procedural overreach is not persuasive. It is arbitrary.

The courts therefore owe FAB 2026-01 no deference.

Not Chevron6 deference, because Chevron is gone.

Not Skidmore7 respect, because FAB 2026-01 lacks the “power to persuade.”

And certainly not controlling weight where the agency’s interpretation conflicts with statutory text, trust-law principles, governing precedent, and the constitutional separation of powers.

ERISA was enacted to protect plan participants and beneficiaries—not to insulate fiduciaries from judicial scrutiny through administrative shortcuts. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure exist to ensure that cases are decided on evidence, not ideology. And Article III reserves adjudication to courts, not agencies seeking to influence litigation outcomes through informal pronouncements masquerading as settled law.

For those reasons, the legal system should reject FAB 2026-01’s suggestion that the proposal is subject to any legal deference and should reaffirm that fiduciary prudence under ERISA remains a judicial question governed by statute, precedent, and the ordinary processes of adjudication—not by agency efforts to predetermine outcomes through extra-statutory administrative advocacy.

The ongoing campaign of betrayal of plan participants and their beneficiaries by both the DOL and the EBSA in order to promote the best interests of both plan sponsors and the insurance induastty must stop in order to preserve ERISA’s integrity and the as well as the statute’s original principles and goals.

Notes
1. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 661 (2024). (Loper Bright)
2. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
3. Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409 (2014).
4. Hughes v. Northwestern University, 595 U.S.170 (2022).
5. Donovan v Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263.
5. Loper Bright, supra.
6. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,467 U.S. 837 (1984).
7. kidmpore v. Swift& Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).

© Copyright 2026 InvestSense, LLC. All rights reserved.

This article is for informational purposes only and is neither designed nor intended to provide legal, investment, or other professional advice since such advice always requires consideration of individual circumstances. If legal, investment, or other professional assistance is needed, the services of an attorney or other qulified professional advisor should be sought.

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Fatally Flawed: Why DOL Administrative Bulletin 2026-01 Will Not, and Should Not, Withstand Judicial Scrutiny

Posted on May 4, 2026 by jwatkins

James W. Watkins, III, J.D., CFP EmeritusTM, AWMA®
InvestSense, LLC

May it please the Court:

EBSA Assistance Bulletin 2026-01 (Bulletin) contains a defect that is not merely analytical, but structural: it is internally inconsistent on its face. The Bulletin expressly conditions enforcement on alignment with “clearly established case law,” yet the governing premise it adopts—that fiduciary prudence may be satisfied by process alone—is unsupported by, and in tension with, the very body of law it invokes. That contradiction is fatal.

Start with the agency’s own limiting principle. By tethering enforcement to “clearly established case law,” EBSA concedes that its authority is bounded by existing judicial interpretations of ERISA and its incorporated trust-law standards. That concession should end the inquiry, because no such “clearly established” authority endorses a purely procedural conception of prudence. To the contrary, the case law uniformly requires a combined assessment of process and substance.

The Supreme Court’s ERISA jurisprudence leaves no room for EBSA’s position. In Tibble v. Edison International, the Court grounded ERISA’s fiduciary duties in trust law and emphasized the ongoing duty to monitor and remove imprudent investments—an obligation that necessarily turns on the substantive merits of the investment, not merely the process used to select it. 575 U.S. 523, 529–30 (2015). In Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, the Court rejected categorical presumptions that would insulate fiduciaries from meaningful scrutiny, insisting instead on a context-sensitive evaluation of whether fiduciary conduct is actually prudent. 573 U.S. 409, 425–26 (2014). And in Hughes v. Northwestern University, the Court made explicit that fiduciaries cannot rely on the existence of some prudent options to excuse the inclusion of imprudent ones. 595 U.S. 170, 177–79 (2022). That holding is irreconcilable with a regime in which process alone suffices.

Lower courts have applied the same integrated standard. In Donovan v. Bierwirth, the Second Circuit held that fiduciaries must act “with an eye single” to participants’ interests and are liable where their decisions deviate from what a prudent fiduciary would have done. 680 F.2d 263, 271–72 (2d Cir. 1982). That inquiry is inherently substantive: it evaluates the economic reasonableness of the decision, not just the procedural steps taken to reach it.

The trust-law principles ERISA incorporates confirm the same point. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 90 does not reduce prudence to process. It imposes a duty to incur only reasonable costs and to pursue appropriate risk–return objectives for beneficiaries. Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 90 cmt. b, d (Am. L. Inst. 2007). Those are substantive constraints. A fiduciary who follows a careful process but selects objectively inferior or excessively costly investments has not satisfied the duty of prudence under trust law.

Against that backdrop, the Bulletin’s internal contradiction becomes clear. It purports to require adherence to “clearly established case law,” yet it advances a standard—procedural prudence alone—that no such case law recognizes. That is not an interpretation; it is a departure. And it is a departure in a direction the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected: toward categorical insulation of fiduciary conduct from substantive review.

This inconsistency has concrete consequences. By anchoring enforcement to “clearly established law” while simultaneously redefining that law in a way that strips out substantive review, EBSA creates an illusory constraint. The Bulletin appears to narrow agency discretion, but in practice expands it—allowing fiduciaries to claim compliance based on process alone, even where outcomes are economically indefensible. That result cannot be reconciled with ERISA’s text, which requires fiduciaries to act with the “care, skill, prudence, and diligence” of a prudent person, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B), nor with ERISA’s purpose of protecting plan participants. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).

Nor is this a gap in the law that the agency may fill. Where the Supreme Court and the circuits have already articulated the governing standard, there is no ambiguity for the agency to resolve. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). And even if there were, an interpretation that conflicts with those precedents would be unreasonable as a matter of law. Cf. Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558, 575–76 (2019).

In short, EBSA cannot have it both ways. It cannot invoke “clearly established case law” as a limiting principle while advancing a fiduciary standard that no such law supports. The Bulletin’s premise is not merely unpersuasive—it is unmoored from ERISA, from trust law, and from controlling precedent. That internal inconsistency renders the Bulletin arbitrary, legally unsound, and undeserving of judicial acceptance. For those reasons, and for the reasons previously stated, the Court should reject EBSA’s formulation and reaffirm that fiduciary prudence under ERISA requires both procedural integrity and substantive reasonableness.Discuss the fact that the EBSA’s arguments suggesting stronger pleading standards and restrictions on discovery are inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as are the EBSA’s attempts to decide cases on their merits, which is the exclusive province of the courts, not federal agencies

That aspect of the Bulletin presents an additional—and independently disqualifying—legal flaw. EBSA is not merely misreading ERISA’s fiduciary standard; it is attempting to reshape federal litigation itself in a manner that conflicts with governing procedural law and exceeds its institutional role.

First, the Bulletin’s suggestion that ERISA claims should be subject to heightened pleading standards is incompatible with the framework established by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009), clarified that complaints must be “plausible,” not that they must plead detailed evidence or prove their case at the outset. Nothing in those decisions authorizes an agency—through sub-regulatory guidance—to impose ERISA-specific super-pleading requirements.

To the contrary, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected efforts to impose categorical or heightened barriers at the pleading stage in ERISA fiduciary litigation. In Hughes v. Northwestern University, 595 U.S. 170, 177–79 (2022), the Court reversed dismissal of fiduciary breach claims precisely because the lower courts had demanded too much at the pleading stage. The Court emphasized that ERISA claims must be evaluated under ordinary pleading standards, with context-specific analysis—not judicially or administratively imposed shortcuts that truncate meritorious claims before discovery.

Second, the Bulletin’s effort to restrict access to discovery is equally inconsistent with the Rules. Under Rule 26(b)(1), parties are entitled to obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case. In ERISA fiduciary breach cases, discovery is often indispensable because the relevant information—fee structures, benchmarking data, fiduciary deliberations—is uniquely within the control of the fiduciaries themselves. The Supreme Court recognized this asymmetry in Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 425 (2014), cautioning courts to balance the need to weed out meritless claims against the reality that plaintiffs frequently require discovery to substantiate their allegations.

EBSA’s position effectively inverts that balance. By encouraging early merits-based screening and constrained discovery, it imposes evidentiary burdens at the pleading stage that the Federal Rules do not permit. That is not an interpretation of ERISA; it is an attempt to rewrite the procedural architecture governing federal litigation.

Third—and most fundamentally—the Bulletin intrudes into the adjudicative function itself. Determining whether a fiduciary’s conduct was prudent under ERISA is a merits question entrusted to Article III courts. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110–11 (1989) (grounding ERISA adjudication in trust-law principles applied by courts). Agencies may enforce statutes and promulgate rules within delegated authority, but they do not decide private ERISA breach claims on their merits. By framing certain categories of conduct as effectively compliant—based on process alone—and by encouraging dismissal prior to factual development, EBSA is functionally pre-judging cases that Congress assigned to the judiciary..

Finally, this procedural overreach reinforces the Bulletin’s internal inconsistency. EBSA claims fidelity to “clearly established case law,” yet no such case law authorizes an agency to heighten pleading standards, curtail discovery, or effectively adjudicate fiduciary prudence through guidance documents. The governing authorities—Rule 8, Rule 26, and decisions such as Twombly, Iqbal, Hughes, and Dudenhoeffer—point in the opposite direction: toward ordinary pleading standards, context-sensitive analysis, and fact development through discovery.

That separation-of-functions problem is not abstract. It has concrete doctrinal consequences. The Federal Rules reflect a deliberate allocation of responsibility: pleadings test legal sufficiency; discovery develops the factual record; and summary judgment or trial resolves the merits. EBSA’s approach collapses those stages into a single, front-loaded inquiry dominated by agency-preferred factors. That approach is incompatible with the Rules Enabling Act framework and with the Supreme Court’s repeated insistence that ERISA fiduciary claims be evaluated through ordinary litigation processes—not through categorical screens or presumptions imposed from outside the judiciary.

In short, EBSA’s litigation-focused positions are not merely unpersuasive—they are ultra vires. They conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, encroach on the judiciary’s exclusive role in adjudicating ERISA claims, and further underscore that the Bulletin is not an application of “clearly established law,” but a departure from it.

As a result, the Senate should schedule EBSA oversight hearings as soon as possible to detrmine if the totality of the EBSA actions thus far have constitutued a bretrayal of American workers. One can easily argue , with merit, that the unexplainied decision not to pursue the appeal of the Retirement Security Rule was a betryal of American wrol=kers, especially given given the support of both the the support the Rule and the process that the DOL employed, by two prominent federal judges, Judge Barbara Lynn of the Northernern District of Texas, and Judge Carl Stewart of the Fifth Circuirt, who openly dissented from the Fiffth Circuit in the courts’s decision to stay the enforcement of the Rule.

The Senate should also inquire into why the EBSA, in connection with the decision not to pursue the Retirement Security Rule decision, promised that a new version of the Rule would be forthcoming, only to have the EBSA subsequently announce that no such revision would be forthcoming, with no meaningful explanantion for the change in plans. During this time, the EBSA has issued several amicus briefs, all supporting and advocating on behalf of the best interests of plan sponsors and the insurance industry, at the expense of plan participants and their beneficiries, the very parties that ERISA states are to be protected.

© Copyright 2026 InvestSense, LLC. All rights reserved.

This article is for informational purposes only and is neither designed nor intended to provide legal, investment, or other professional advice since such advice always requires consideration of individual circumstances. If legal, investment, or other professional assistance is needed, the services of an attorney or other qulified professional advisor should be sought.

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Terminal Wealth: The True Fiduciary Prudence Paradigm with Regard to the In-Plan Annuity Scam

Posted on April 21, 2026 by jwatkins

James W. Watkins, III, J.D., CFP EmeritusTM, AWMA®
InvestSense, LLC

A sound evaluation of fiduciary prudence must ultimately be anchored in outcomes, not just process—and in the context of long-term financial decision-making, the most meaningful outcome is terminal wealth. Fiduciaries are entrusted not merely with following procedures, but with stewarding assets in a way that maximizes the beneficiary’s financial position at the end of the investment horizon. While process-oriented metrics like diversification, cost control, and adherence to policy statements are important, they are only proxies for what truly matters: the financial result delivered.

This principle becomes especially clear when annuities that require annuitization enter the analysis. Such products fundamentally alter the nature of wealth by converting a liquid, inheritable asset base into an irreversible income stream. Once annuitization occurs, the remaining capital is no longer accessible, transferable, or responsive to changing circumstances. That decision locks in a terminal wealth outcome at the moment of conversion, often eliminating residual value altogether unless specific (and typically costly) riders are in place.

A fiduciary evaluating whether to recommend or include such an annuity must therefore weigh not just the stability of income provided, but the impact on total terminal wealth. An income stream may appear attractive in isolation, but if it comes at the cost of significantly reduced aggregate wealth—particularly when compared to alternative strategies that preserve liquidity and optionality—it raises serious questions about prudence. The fiduciary duty of care demands a holistic comparison, not a narrow focus on income smoothing or behavioral benefits.

Moreover, terminal wealth captures critical dimensions of financial well-being that annuitization can compromise. These include legacy goals, flexibility in response to unforeseen expenses, and the ability to adapt to market or personal changes. A strategy that maximizes guaranteed income but leaves no residual estate may fail to align with a client’s broader objectives, even if it appears “safe” on the surface. Prudence, in this sense, cannot be reduced to minimizing volatility or ensuring predictability; it must incorporate the full economic trade-offs involved.

Importantly, focusing on terminal wealth does not imply ignoring risk—it reframes it. The relevant question is not simply whether an approach reduces short-term uncertainty, but whether it does so efficiently relative to the long-term cost. Annuities that require annuitization often embed significant fees, mortality credits, and insurer profit margins, all of which can erode expected value. A fiduciary who overlooks these impacts in favor of superficial guarantees risks prioritizing form over substance.

In conclusion, terminal wealth serves as a unifying metric that integrates return, risk, cost, and constraint into a single, outcome-oriented standard. Especially when dealing with irreversible decisions like annuitization, it provides a clear lens through which fiduciary prudence can be judged. A process may be compliant, and an income stream may be stable, but if the end result unnecessarily diminishes the client’s total financial position, the fiduciary has fallen short of their fundamental obligation.

For fiduciary prudence purposes, compare two paths for a 65-year-old female investing $100,000:

  • Option A: Immediate annuity (fully annuitized, no residual value)
  • Option B: Laddered portfolio of Treasury notes/CDs (principal preserved, modest yield, terminal wealth remains)

Key Assumptions

  • Immediate annuity payout: ~$6,500/year (typical for a 65F, no inflation adjustment)
  • Life expectancy: ~21 years (to age 86)
  • Discount rate (risk-free benchmark): 3.5%
  • Laddered portfolio yield: 3.5% annually
  • Portfolio withdrawals: matched to annuity income ($6,500/year)
  • Residual portfolio value remains accessible (terminal wealth)

1. Present Value & Terminal Wealth Comparison

MetricImmediate AnnuityLaddered T-Notes/CD Portfolio
Initial Investment$100,000$100,000
Annual Income$6,500$6,500 (self-withdrawal)
Present Value of Income (21 yrs @ 3.5%)~$96,000~$96,000
Terminal Wealth at Life Expectancy$0~$100,000
LiquidityNoneFull (subject to ladder structure)
Mortality Credit BenefitYesNo
Residual Estate ValueNonePreserved

2. Mortality-Adjusted Breakeven Analysis

To determine when the annuity “wins” on a terminal wealth basis, we calculate the age at which cumulative annuity payments (discounted) exceed both:

  • The initial $100,000, and
  • The preserved terminal wealth from the ladder strategy
AgeYears of PaymentsCumulative PaymentsPV of Payments @3.5%Ladder Terminal WealthNet Advantage
7510$65,000~$54,000~$100,000Ladder dominates
8015$97,500~$77,000~$100,000Ladder dominates
86 (life expectancy)21$136,500~$96,000~$100,000Ladder slightly ahead
9025$162,500~$110,000~$100,000Rough breakeven
9530$195,000~$130,000~$100,000Annuity dominates

3. Interpretation for Fiduciary Prudence

  • At normal life expectancy (86):
    The annuity does not fully recover its opportunity cost when evaluated on a present value + terminal wealth basis.
  • Breakeven occurs ~age 90+:
    The annuity requires above-average longevity to justify its irreversible loss of capital.
  • Mortality risk is the pivot:
    The annuity only outperforms if the individual lives significantly longer than expected, effectively “earning” mortality credits.
  • Terminal wealth gap is decisive:
    The ladder strategy preserves ~$100,000 in estate value, while the annuity reduces this to zero.

4. Fiduciary Conclusion

From a fiduciary prudence perspective grounded in terminal wealth:

  • The annuity represents a longevity insurance bet, not a wealth-maximizing strategy under average conditions.
  • The laddered portfolio dominates under expected mortality, offering equivalent income, retained liquidity, and preserved terminal wealth.
  • Recommending annuitization without clear evidence of above-average longevity or strong income certainty needs risks subordinating total economic value to income framing.

The breakeven analysis shows that annuitization must be justified not by its guarantees alone, but by a probabilistic expectation of extended lifespan sufficient to overcome the embedded loss of capital. Prudent investors and prudent investment fiduciaries simply do not voluntairly forfeit capital without even the opportunity to receive a commensurate return. My investors shaerw the same sentiments of Mark Twain – “I am not so concerned about the return ON my investment as I am the return OF my investment! Yet, a simple breakeven analysis of most in-plan annuities, once present value and mortality risk are factored in, shows that is the likely result.

This is why we advised our fiduciary risk minimization clients to insiste that anyone recommending an in-plan annuity for their plan provide them with a properly prepared written breakeven analysis similar to the one contained herein. Why written? It can conveniently serve as “Exhibit A” if litigation becomes necessary. Requiring such documentation also helps establich a plan sponsor’s due diligence process, which is always a good thing in fiduciary litigation. Full disclosure: Don’t expect an in-plan annuity peddler to agree to your request. After they know the quality of their products. Now so do you. As arguably the nation’s leading ERISA attorneys, Fred Reish, is fond of saying: “Forewarned is forearmed.”

© Copyright 2026 InvestSense, LLC. All rights reserved.

This article is for informational purposes only and is neither designed nor intended to provide legal, investment, or other professional advice since such advice always requires consideration of individual circumstances. If legal, investment, or other professional assistance is needed, the services of an attorney or other qulified professional advisor should be sought.

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Is the DOL/EBSA Trying to Serve Two Masters? ERISA Section 404(a)’s Independent Investigation and Evaluation Requirements and the DOL/EBSA Proposed Rule on Alternative Investments

Posted on April 12, 2026 by jwatkins

Is the DOL and EBSA trying to Serve Two Masters? The DOL’s proposed rule for alyternative investments suggests the answer is “yes,” given the known lack of transparency associaes with such products. Worse yet, it has been suggested that alternative investments be considered as qualified default investment alternatives (QDIAs).

  • Matthew 6:24

“No one can serve two masters. Either you will hate the one and love the other, or you will be devoted to the one and despise the other. You cannot serve both God and money.”

This teaching is part of Jesus’ Sermon on the Mount and emphasizes divided loyalty—specifically warning against trying to prioritize both God and material wealth.

The DOL’s recently proposed rule on alternative investments ignores the fact that ERISA section 404(a) requires a plan sponsor to conduct an independent investigation and evaluation on each investment option chosen for a 401k plan. However, the very nature of alternative investments typically involves a basic lack of transparency, which effectively prevents the verification by a plan sponsor required by ERISA 404(a).

The Department of Labor’s Proposed Rule Impermissibly Dilutes ERISA § 404(a)’s Core Requirement of Independent Investigation

The Department of Labor’s proposed rule concerning the inclusion of alternative investments in defined contribution plans fails to grapple with a foundational requirement of fiduciary prudence under ERISA: the duty to conduct an independent investigation and evaluation of each investment option prior to its selection. This obligation, embedded in ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), is not aspirational—it is mandatory, and it has been consistently reinforced by the courts as a substantive component of fiduciary prudence.

At its core, ERISA fiduciary law—grounded in trust law—requires more than procedural formalities. It requires that fiduciaries know what they are doing, based on a reasoned and independent evaluation of the merits and risks of each investment. This duty cannot be satisfied where the investment itself resists meaningful scrutiny.

Alternative investments, by their very design, frequently lack transparency. They often involve opaque valuation methodologies, limited disclosure, illiquidity, and reliance on sponsor-provided data that cannot be independently verified. These characteristics create an inherent structural barrier to the very investigation ERISA requires. A fiduciary cannot prudently evaluate what it cannot adequately see, test, or verify.

The Department’s proposed rule attempts to reconcile this irreconcilable tension by implicitly lowering the bar—suggesting that procedural steps or generalized due diligence may suffice even where substantive verification is not possible. But this approach conflicts with the governing statutory standard. ERISA does not permit fiduciaries to substitute trust in representations for independent judgment grounded in verifiable information.

The principle at issue can be captured succinctly: a fiduciary cannot simultaneously satisfy the duty of independent investigation while relying on investment structures that preclude such investigation. As a matter of logic and law, these obligations are mutually exclusive.

This tension is aptly illustrated by the well-known admonition: “No one can serve two masters… You cannot serve both God and money.” (Matthew 6:24). While not a source of legal authority, the analogy is instructive. Under Aronowiz’s leadership, a valid argument can be made that everything the EBSA has done has been been to impermissibly promote and protect the best interests of plan sponosrs and the insurance industry, at the expense of plan particiapnts and their beneficiaries. This is clearly inconsistent with ERISA’s stated goals and purpoaes and the DOL’s mission statement.

Just as divided loyalties are untenable in that context, so too is the attempt to reconcile ERISA’s demand for independent fiduciary judgment with investment vehicles that inherently depend on blind reliance. A fiduciary cannot serve both the statutory mandate of independent evaluation and the practical reality of opaque, unverifiable investment products.

The Department’s rule effectively invites fiduciaries to attempt precisely that—placing them in an untenable position where compliance with ERISA § 404(a) is, in practice, compromised. Courts have repeatedly rejected such dilution of fiduciary duty, emphasizing that prudence requires both a thorough investigation and a reasoned determination based on that investigation. Where the investigation itself is constrained by opacity, the resulting decision cannot be deemed prudent.

Accordingly, the proposed rule is not merely incomplete; it is fundamentally inconsistent with ERISA’s fiduciary framework. By failing to account for the incompatibility between alternative investments’ lack of transparency and the statutory requirement of independent investigation and evaluation, the Department has advanced a standard that cannot be reconciled with established law. It also sets up plan sponsors for litigation for a fiduciary breach, the EBSA’s preferred ruse du jour.

American workers deserve an, by law, are entitled to better protection. In a March 26, 2026, New York Times article described various reports by current and former DOL employees and describing the current DOL environment as “chaos.” As a result, Senator Grassley, a member of the HELP committee (Health, Education, Labor and Pensions )has reportedly requested documents and is considering requesting oversight hearings into the current issues at the DOL. Hopefully, the HELP committee will also consider expanding any Congressional oversight hearings to address the EBSA’s continual disregard for relevant legal precedent and ERISA’s stated purposes.

© Copyright 2026 InvestSense, LLC. All rights reserved

This article is for informational purposes only and is neither designed nor intended to provide legal, investment, or other professional advice since such advice always requires consideration of individual circumstances. If legal, investment, or other professional assistance is needed, the services of an attorney or other professional advisor should be sought.

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Much Ado About Nothing?: The DOL’s New Alternative Investment Rule vs. the Administrative Procedure Act

Posted on April 5, 2026 by jwatkins

James W. Watkins, III, J.D., CFP EmeritusTM, AWMA®
InvestSense, LLC

When the DOL announced the relases of its new alternative investments rule, we quickly advised out fiduciary risk minimization clients to simply ignore it, as it failed our basic two-step fiduciary analysis process:

1. Does ERISA require the product/strategy to be offered within a plan?
2. If not, could/would the product/strategy potentially expose the plan to unnecessary fiduciary liability? Here, even the DOL warned plan sponsors of the potential liability.

The second reason we advised our fiducairy riask management to simply ignore the proposed rule altogether was that upon review of the rule, I concluded that thre is little chance of the proposed rule passing judicial scrutiny under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), as the rule is “arbitrary and capricious” based on current APA judicial precedent.

Upon close examination, despite being titled i nterms of “alternative investments,” I consider the release and proposed riule to be yet another continued attempt to illegally deny plan participants acccess to the courts, which is clearly inconsistent with Congessional intent, as evidenced by the legislative history of ERISA. Furhter evidence of this intent is supported by the fact that release used the term “litigation” over 105 times.

The Proposed Rule and EBSA’s Litigation Positions Violate the Administrative Procedure Act

The Department’s proposed rule cannot withstand scrutiny under the Administrative Procedure Act1 because it is internally inconsistent, departs from prior agency positions without adequate explanation, and rests on rationales that conflict with both statutory text and binding precedent.

I. The Rule Is Arbitrary and Capricious Because It Is Inconsistent with ERISA’s Trust Law Foundation

The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 fiduciary duties are derived from the common law of trusts. In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch2, the Court made clear that “ERISA abounds with the language and terminology of trust law” and must be interpreted accordingly. Likewise, Varity Corp. v. Howe3 reaffirmed that courts should look to “the law of trusts” to define fiduciary obligations under ERISA.

More recently, in Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer4, the Court again emphasized that ERISA’s fiduciary standards are rooted in trust law principles, rejecting attempts to create atextual modifications to those duties.

Those principles include the burden-shifting framework reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 100, under which a fiduciary who has breached its duty bears the burden of proving that the breach did not cause the loss.

By adopting a rule that effectively avoids or undermines these trust law consequences, the Department is not interpreting ERISA—it is contradicting it. Under Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.5, agency action is arbitrary and capricious where it “runs counter to the evidence before the agency” or fails to align with governing law. That is precisely the defect here.

II. The Department Fails to Provide a Reasoned Explanation for Departing from Prior Positions

An agency must provide a reasoned explanation when it changes course. In FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.6, the Court held that while agencies may revise their policies, they must “display awareness that it is changing position” and show that the new policy is permissible and justified.

Here, the Employee Benefits Security Administration has, in prior amicus briefs, emphasized ERISA’s grounding in trust law and the importance of fiduciary accountability consistent with those principles. The proposed rule adopts a materially different approach—one that minimizes or avoids the implications of trust law, including burden shifting.

Yet the Department offers no acknowledgment of this shift, let alone a reasoned explanation. Under Fox, that failure alone renders the rule unlawful.

III. The Department’s Reliance on “Frivolous Litigation” Is Pretextual and Contrary to ERISA’s Legislative Design

The Department’s asserted concern about “frivolous litigation” is both legally insufficient and internally contradictory.

As an initial matter, ERISA’s enforcement scheme reflects Congress’s deliberate choice to rely on private litigation. In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell7, the Court recognized that ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions were “carefully integrated” to provide participants with meaningful remedies. Similarly, LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates8, Inc. reaffirmed the central role of participant lawsuits in enforcing fiduciary duties.

An agency may not invoke concerns about litigation to undermine a statutory scheme that expressly depends on it.

Moreover, under State Farm, an agency acts arbitrarily when it offers an explanation that is implausible or inconsistent with the record. Here, the Department’s litigation rationale conflicts with its own prior positions. In amicus briefs, the EBSA has repeatedly defended robust private enforcement as essential to ERISA’s function. Its current reliance on litigation as a justification for weakening fiduciary accountability is therefore pretextual.

IV. The Rule Reflects Impermissible Outcome-Oriented Reasoning

The APA prohibits agencies from adopting rules driven by desired outcomes rather than reasoned analysis. In Department of Commerce v. New York9, the Court rejected agency action where the stated rationale was pretextual and did not reflect the agency’s true reasoning.

Here, the structure of the rule reveals an effort to avoid the consequences of applying trust law principles—particularly the burden placed on fiduciaries to disprove causation following a breach. The Department is aware that this burden would expose widespread fiduciary vulnerability, especially in connection with complex financial products such as annuities.

But avoiding statutory consequences is not a permissible basis for regulation. As the Court emphasized in State Farm, agencies must engage in reasoned decision-making grounded in the statute—not in policy preferences about economic impact.

V. The Rule’s Internal Contradictions Undermine Its Reasonableness

Finally, the rule is independently invalid because it is internally inconsistent. It purports to clarify fiduciary duties while simultaneously adopting standards that dilute them. It invokes ERISA’s protective purpose while advancing interpretations that weaken enforcement.

Such contradictions violate the APA’s requirement of reasoned decision-making. As State Farm makes clear, an agency must articulate a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” The Department has failed to do so.       

VI. The Proposed Rule Is Not Entitled to Deference Under Chevron or Loper Bright

The Department cannot rely on judicial deference to salvage the proposed rule. Whether analyzed under the traditional framework of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.10 or the Supreme Court’s more recent decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo11, the rule fails.

A. Even Under Chevron, the Rule Is Unlawful

Under Chevron, an agency interpretation receives deference only if (1) the statute is ambiguous and (2) the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.

Neither condition is satisfied here.

At Step One, ERISA is not ambiguous as to the source of its fiduciary standards. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 incorporates the common law of trusts. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch; Varity Corp. v. Howe; Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer. That interpretive directive leaves no gap for the agency to fill with a conflicting framework.

At Step Two, even if ambiguity existed, the Department’s interpretation would still fail because it is not reasonable. An interpretation that effectively discards core trust law principles—such as the burden-shifting framework reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 100—cannot be reconciled with the statute’s structure or purpose.

Chevron deference does not permit an agency to adopt an interpretation that contradicts the very body of law Congress incorporated.

B. Under Loper Bright, the Court Owes No Deference to the Agency’s Interpretation

Any reliance on Chevron is, in any event, misplaced. In Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, the Supreme Court made clear that courts must exercise independent judgment in interpreting statutes and may not defer to agency interpretations merely because a statute is ambiguous.

Under Loper Bright, the question is not whether the Department’s interpretation is permissible, but whether it is correct.

It is not.

Applying independent judicial judgment, the Court must interpret ERISA in accordance with its text, structure, and historical context—all of which point to trust law as the governing framework. As discussed, that framework includes established principles governing fiduciary liability and burden allocation.

The Department’s rule, which attempts to avoid those principles, cannot survive de novo review.

C. The Major Questions Doctrine Further Confirms That Deference Is Inappropriate

Even if ambiguity could be manufactured, this case implicates questions of vast economic and legal significance. The rule effectively reshapes fiduciary liability exposure across the retirement system, with substantial downstream effects on plan sponsors, financial institutions, and fiduciary liability insurers.

Under West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency12, courts require clear congressional authorization before permitting agencies to exercise such sweeping authority.

No such authorization exists here. ERISA does not grant the Department power to redefine fiduciary liability in a manner that departs from its trust law foundation. To the contrary, the statute presumes adherence to those principles.

Conclusion

Because the proposed rule conflicts with Supreme Court precedent interpreting ERISA, departs from prior agency positions without explanation, relies on pretextual reasoning, and fails the standards articulated in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. and FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., it violates the Administrative Procedure Act.

Furthermore, because the proposed rule fails under both Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, and raises serious concerns under West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency, it is not entitled to judicial deference.

The Court should interpret ERISA independently and should rule that the rule is ulawful and set the rule aside.

Notes
1. Admininstrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. Sections 551 -559.
2. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
3. Varity v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
4. Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudednhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409 (2014).
5. Motor Vehicle Mfg. Assn. v. State Farm Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
6. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. ____ (2009).
7. Mass Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
8. LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg, & Associates, 553 U.S. 248 (2008).
9. Dept. of Commerce v. New York, 558 U.S. ____ (2019).
10. Checron USAInc. v. NAtural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.837 (1984).
11. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 200 U.S. 321 (2024).
12. West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697 (2022).

© Copyright 2026 InvestSense, LLC. All rights reserved

This article is for informational purposes only and is neither designed nor intended to provide legal, investment, or other professional advice since such advice always requires consideration of individual circumstances. If legal, investment, or other professional assistance is needed, the services of an attorney or other professional advisor should be sought.

About jwatkins

I am a securities and ERISA attorney. I hold CFP Board Emeritus™ status and I am an Accredited Wealth Management Advisor™. I provide fiduciary risk management consulting to 401k/430b plans, trustees, RIAs and other investment fiduciaries. I am a 1977 graduate of Georgia State University and a 1981 graduate of the University of Notre Dame Law School. I am the author of “CommonSense InvestSense: The Power of the Informed Investor” and “The 401(k)/403(b) Investment Manual: What Plan Sponsors and Plan Participants REALLY Need To Know” I write two blogs, “CommonSense InvestSense, investsense.com, and “The Prudent Investment Fiduciary Rules, fiduciaryinvestsense.com. As a former compliance director, I have extensive experience in evaluating the legal prudence of various types of investments, including mutual funds and annuities. My goal is to combine my legal and compliance experience in order to help educate investors and investment fiduciaries on sound, proven investment strategies that will help them protect their financial security and/or avoid unnecessary fiduciary liability exposure.

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Reasserting ERISA’s Private Enforcement Design: A Rebuttal to EBSA’s “Frivolous Litigation” Narrative

Posted on March 31, 2026 by jwatkins

James W. Watkins, III, J.D., CFP EmeritusTM, AWMA®
InvestSense, LLC

I. Introduction

Recent statements by the EBSA leadership and Assistant DOL Secretary, Daniel Aronowitz, frame ERISA litigation as abusive,” “frivolous,” and in need of increased structural restrictions. Aronowitz has called for a “PSLRA” for ERISA, similar to the SEC Act covering the general securities market. Aronowitz has advocated for heightened pleading standards, restricted standing requirements, and judicial doctrines designed to shield ERISA fiduciaries from litigation and liability.

This position, however, is inconsistent with ERISA’s statutory design, controlling Supreme court precedent, and the legislative history of ERISA itself. Properly understood, ERISA depends upon participant-driven litigation as a primary enforcement mechanism. Therefore, efforts to restrict access to the courts undermine -not further- ERISA’s core purposes.

II. THE EBSA’s PRETEXTUAL JUSTIFICATION CONTRADICTS ERISA’S TEXT, PURPOSE, AND LEGISLATIVE DESIGN

A. ERISA Was Deliberately Designed As a Participant-Enforced Statute Providing Broad Access to Federal Courts

Congress’ intent is explicit in both statutory text and legislative history: ERISA is a remedial, litigation-driven enforcement regime.

1.. Statutory Mandate: “Ready Access to the Federal Courts”

ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b), provides:

“to protect … participants and beneficiaries … by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.”

This is not aspirational language; it is a structural directive that civil litigation is the primary enforcement mechanism.

2.. Legislative History Confirms Congress Intended Expansive Participant Litigation

The Senate and House Reports—consistently relied upon by the Supreme Court—state:

  • Senate Report No. 93-127: ERISA is “designed specifically to provide… participants and beneficiaries with broad remedies for redressing or preventing violations.”
  • Further: to provide “the full range of legal and equitable remedies … and to remove jurisdictional and procedural obstacles … which hampered effective enforcement.”
  • House Report No. 93-533: enforcement provisions are to be “liberally construed to provide … broad remedies.”

3. Doctrinal Implications

Congress made three deliberate choices:

  1. Participants—not regulators—would enforce fiduciary obligations
  2. Courts—not agencies—would police fiduciary conduct
  3. Barriers to litigation were to be removed, not erected

IiI. Supreme Court Doctrine Reinforces That Courts Already Possess Adequate Tools to Address Abusive Litigation

Recent Supreme Court oral arguments directly undermine claims that ERISA litigation requires additional gatekeeping.

A. Justice Jackson: Courts Already Police Frivolous Litigation

During oral argument (e.g., fiduciary breach / pleading sufficiency context), Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson emphasized:

“Don’t we already have tools to deal with frivolous litigation?”

She specifically referenced:

  • Motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)
  • Rule 11 sanctions
  • Judicial control over discovery

And further:

“Why isn’t that sufficient?”

3. Litigation Significance

This line of questioning reflects a critical doctrinal principle:

The federal judiciary—not administrative agencies—controls the calibration of litigation burdens and abuse prevention.

4. Structural Separation: Judicial Case Management vs. Substantive Barriers

The Court’s discussion highlights a distinction:

Proper MechanismImproper Mechanism
Rule 12(b)(6) dismissalHeightened pleading beyond statute
Rule 11 sanctionsCategorical limits on claims
Managed discoveryPreclusion of participant suits

ERISA’s design aligns exclusively with the left column.

IV. EBSA’s Amicus Positions Advocating Restrictions on ERISA Litigation Are Doctrinally Inconsistent with Congressional Design

The litigation positions advanced by the Employee Benefits Security Administration—particularly under leadership such as Daniel Aronowitz—frequently assert that ERISA litigation is plagued by “frivolous” claims requiring judicial constraint.

A. EBSA’s “Frivolous Litigation” Thesis

EBSA has argued in multiple amicus contexts that:

  • ERISA litigation imposes undue burdens on plan sponsors
  • Courts should impose stricter pleading or evidentiary thresholds
  • Discovery should be curtailed to prevent abuse

B. Direct Conflict with Congressional Intent

These positions are irreconcilable with ERISA’s legislative design:

Congressional IntentEBSA Litigation Position
“Ready access to courts”Restrict access via heightened thresholds
“Broad remedies”Narrow actionable claims
Remove procedural obstaclesIntroduce new litigation barriers
Participant-driven enforcementSponsor-protective filtering

C. Conflict with Supreme Court Reasoning

EBSA’s approach is also inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s expressed view—articulated in questioning by Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson—that:

Existing procedural tools are sufficient to address abusive litigation.

D. Doctrinal Tension

EBSA’s position implicitly asserts:

Courts are incapable of managing ERISA litigation without additional constraints.

The Supreme Court’s response:

Courts already possess—and routinely employ—adequate mechanisms.

V. ERISA’s Trust-Law Foundations Further Undermine EBSA’s Restrictive Approach

ERISA is grounded in the common law of trusts. Under trust law:

  • Beneficiaries have broad rights to sue fiduciaries
  • Courts serve as the primary forum for enforcement
  • Remedies are expansive and equitable in nature

Key Principle

Limiting access to courts is antithetical to fiduciary accountability.

EBSA’s litigation stance effectively inverts this structure by:

  • Shielding fiduciaries from scrutiny
  • Elevating sponsor interests over beneficiary rights
  • Reintroducing the very enforcement barriers ERISA was enacted to eliminate

VI. Conclusion: EBSA’s Litigation Positions Represent a Structural Departure from ERISA’s Core Enforcement Model

The combined weight of:

  • Statutory text (“ready access to the Federal courts”)
  • Legislative history (“broad remedies,” “remove obstacles”)
  • Supreme Court reasoning (courts already control frivolous litigation)

establishes a clear rule:

ERISA enforcement depends on robust participant access to judicial remedies, not administrative or judicial contraction of claims at the threshold.

Accordingly, any argument—whether advanced by EBSA or otherwise—that seeks to curtail participant litigation based on generalized concerns about “frivolous” suits is:

  1. Contrary to congressional intent
  2. In tension with Supreme Court doctrine
  3. Inconsistent with ERISA’s trust-law foundations

VII. ERISA’s Text and Legislative Purpose Affirmatively Enshrine Civil Litigation as a Core Enforcement Mechanism

EBSA’s attempt to characterize participant litigation as “frivolous” or excessive is irreconcilable with the statute Congress enacted.

Congress expressly designed ERISA to expand—not restrict—access to federal courts as a primary enforcement tool. The statute itself provides for “appropriate remedies and access to the federal courts” as a central means of protecting participants. 

This was not incidental. It reflects Congress’s deliberate rejection of an exclusively administrative enforcement regime in favor of participant-driven litigation as a necessary enforcement backstop.

A. Legislative Design: Private Enforcement Was Intended to Supplement Limited Government Oversight

ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme (§ 502(a)) was modeled to ensure that plan participants act as “private attorneys general”, filling enforcement gaps left by limited agency resources. Courts have repeatedly recognized that ERISA’s structure depends on private suits to ensure fiduciary accountability.

This design mirrors other federal statutes—such as the False Claims Act—where Congress explicitly empowered private litigants to vindicate statutory violations when government enforcement is insufficient. See, e.g., the qui tam mechanism allowing citizens to sue “on behalf of the government” to enforce statutory compliance. 

The analogy is instructive: Congress uses private litigation precisely where violations are difficult to detect and regulators face structural limits—conditions that are equally present in ERISA fiduciary misconduct.

B. Legislative History Confirms Congress Intended Broad, Participant-Friendly Court Access

The legislative history of ERISA repeatedly emphasizes that effective enforcement required ready access to federal courts:

  • Congress intended “full and fair access to the courts” for participants and beneficiaries (Conference Report).
  • Civil actions were designed as the “primary enforcement mechanism” to ensure fiduciary compliance.
  • The statutory scheme reflects concern that without robust litigation rights, fiduciary standards would be “illusory.”

Thus, EBSA’s position willfully ignores congressional intent: what the agency labels “frivolous litigation” is, in fact, the mechanism Congress deliberately empowered to police fiduciary abuse.

VIII. EBSA’s Position Impermissibly Rewrites ERISA by Imposing Extra-Statutory Barriers to Suit

Recent policy arguments—such as heightened pleading standards, discovery stays, or procedural barriers justified by “meritless litigation”—are not neutral refinements. They are substantive restrictions on statutory rights.

As reflected in ongoing legislative proposals aimed at “curb[ing] meritless class actions” by raising pleading burdens and staying discovery, such efforts would materially limit participants’ ability to enforce ERISA rights. 

But those restrictions are for Congress—not EBSA—to enact. Agencies cannot:

  • Rewrite § 502(a)’s broad grant of standing;
  • Narrow judicial remedies Congress deliberately made expansive; or
  • Rebalance enforcement away from participants toward regulated entities.

To do so violates basic separation-of-powers principles and the settled rule that agencies may not override statutory enforcement schemes through policy preferences.

IX. The “Frivolous Litigation” Narrative Is Factually and Structurally Misleading

A. ERISA Litigation Is Already Heavily Filtered by Courts

Federal courts already apply:

  • Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal standards
  • Heightened pleading requirements under modern jurisprudence
  • Summary judgment standards
  • Sanctions for frivolous claims

Thus, the premise that ERISA litigation proceeds unchecked is demonstrabl false and knowingly disingenous. The judiciary—not EBSA—is the constitutionally designated gatekeeper for merit.

B. Enforcement Data Shows Violations Are Widespread, Not Rare

Even EBSA’s own enforcement reporting demonstrates systemic noncompliance, with investigations resulting in widespread corrective actions affecting millions of participants. 

This undercuts any claim that litigation is predominantly frivolous; rather, it reflects pervasive fiduciary violations requiring enforcement.

X. EBSA’s Position Reflects Institutional Bias Favoring Plan Sponsors and Insurers

EBSA’s litigation-restrictive stance is not neutral. It aligns consistently with plan sponsor and insurance industry interests:

  • Limiting discovery reduces exposure of fiduciary misconduct
  • Raising pleading burdens shields conflicted transactions
  • Curtailing class actions reduces aggregate liability

These positions functionally insulate fiduciaries and insurers from accountability, contrary to ERISA’s protective purpose.

XI. Daniel Aronowitz’s Advocacy Further Demonstrates Conflict of Interest

The credibility of the “frivolous litigation” narrative is further undermined by the role of Daniel Aronowitz.

A. Prior Industry Role Creates Structural Conflict

Before his governmental role, Aronowitz was a leading figure in the fiduciary liability insurance industry—a sector that:

  • Directly profits from limiting litigation exposure
  • Prices risk based on expected claims frequency and severity
  • Benefits from procedural barriers that reduce claim viability

Policies restricting ERISA litigation therefore directly align with his prior industry interests.

B. Policy Positions Mirror Insurance Industry Objectives

Aronowitz has publicly advocated for:

  • Reducing “excessive” ERISA litigation
  • Increasing procedural barriers to participant claims
  • Rebalancing enforcement away from private suits

These positions track precisely with insurance industry priorities to reduce claim payouts and litigation risk, reinforcing the appearance—and reality—of a conflict of interest.

XII. Curtailing Participant Litigation Undermines ERISA’s Core Protective Function

ERISA was enacted in response to widespread pension abuses, with Congress concluding that:

  • Disclosure alone was insufficient
  • Administrative oversight was limited
  • Judicial enforcement was essential

Restricting participant access to courts would:

  • Weaken fiduciary accountability
  • Reduce deterrence of misconduct
  • Shift enforcement toward an already resource-constrained agency

In short, it would recreate the very conditions ERISA was designed to eliminate.

XIII. Conclusion

“A tyrant always has a pretext for his tyranny.” – Aesop

Aronowitz and the current EBSA certainly have no shortage of pretextual claims for their biased policies. EBSA’s attempt to justify restricting ERISA litigation as a response to “frivolous claims” is:

  1. Contrary to statutory text, which guarantees access to federal courts;
  2. Inconsistent with legislative history, which designates civil litigation as a primary enforcement mechanism;
  3. Unsupported by empirical reality, given documented widespread violations; and
  4. Tainted by conflict of interest, particularly in light of Aronowitz’s prior role in the fiduciary insurance industry.

The questionable trends in the EBSA’s recent policies, as well as the willful blindness involved, and the easily foreseeable harm that could result, justifies an urgent call for Congress to immediately exercise Congressional oversight over the DOL, the EBSA, and Aronowitz to ensure compliance with the agency’s stated purposes, acting in the best interests of plan participants and their beneficiaries by ensuring the rights and protections guaranteed under ERISA. The urgency is even greater given the fact that The DOL has apparently suspended the ERISA Advisory Council, an oversight which portentially could have addressed the very issues issues addressed herein and prevented the types of pretexts and betrayal cueently being seen at the DOL and EBSA/

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